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When Are Capitalization 
Exceptions Justified? 
ETHAN YALE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a widely accepted general principle that a taxpayer should capi-
talize an expenditure that produces a benefit lasting beyond the cur-
rent tax period. Yet rules putting this principle into practice are 
among the most controversial in all of federal income taxation. 1 Many 
argue that a retreat from the general principle is warranted when de-
signing capitalization rules, and even those who argue that capitaliza-
tion rules ought to be sweeping usually conclude that exceptions are 
necessary or desirable. For instance, most commentators accept un-
critically that expenses incurred to procure certain intangible capital 
should be expensed, as under current law, without exploring whether 
expensing of intangibles costs is inevitable,2 although some have con-
sidered the implications of excepting intangibles costs from capitaliza-
tion.3 Although the arguments with respect to exceptions to 
capitalization for tangible assets have received more attention, no 
consensus view has emerged regarding whether many of the excep-
tions are desirable as a matter of policy. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is 
grateful to Deborah Schenk and Noel Cunningham for helpful comments on drafts of this 
Article. 
1 E.g., John E. Hembera, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Capitalization Issues on Front 
Burner, Olson Says (Aug. 3,2001),2001 TNT 152-7, Aug. 7,2001, available in LEXIS, Tax 
Analysts File (approximately 25% of audit resources for large and mid-sized businesses are 
devoted to capitalization issues); John W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition 
or Enhancement of Intangible Property: A Populist, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 
Va. Tax Rev. 273, 308-09 (2002) ("the most significant federal income tax issue by far in 
audits of big businesses"). 
2 E.g., James B. Mackie III, Unfinished Business of the 1986 Tax Reform Act: An Ef-
fective Tax Rate Analysis of Current Issues in the Taxation of Capital Income, 55 Nat'l Tax 
J. 293, 309 (2002). But see Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, Tax Neutrality and Intangi-
ble Capital, in 2 Tax Policy and the Economy 63, 72 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1988) 
(suggesting that any broad scale attempt to require capitalization of costs of generating 
business goodwill would be difficult to implement given likely taxpayer responses). 
3 Fullerton & Lyon, note 2 (evaluating welfare loss of allowing costs of intangible capital 
to be expensed). 
549 
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This Article is a systematic analysis of the arguments in favor of 
departing from the normative or first-best capitalization rule. There 
are six principal arguments: 
(1) For certain classes of assets, rights, and benefits, it is impossible 
to set rational depreciation rules and, in their absence, capitalization 
does more harm than good. 
(2) The severe departure from normative capitalization rules with 
respect to intangible capital, the bulk of which can be classified as 
business goodwill, is necessary to offset the corporate double tax. 
(3) Given a steady-state pattern of continuing investment, the re-
sults of expensing and capitalization (followed by depreciation) are 
approximately equivalent. In such cases, expensing is appropriate, at 
least where the cost of the resulting income-measurement inaccuracy 
is less than the administrative costs of capitalization. 
(4) For short-term assets the efficiency cost of expensing is less than 
the administrative costs of capitalization. 
(5) The cost of repairs should be deductible based on governing 
precedent. 
(6) Indirect costs should be expensed when it is too burdensome 
either to identify them, or to allocate them when they relate to more 
than one capital asset, or both. 
My conclusion is that the general capitalization principle is more 
robust than generally is appreciated. Some of the arguments justify 
departure from normative capitalization in limited instances, but none 
of them operates as a constraint on normative capitalization to the 
extent commonly accepted. . 
A common strand running through the arguments for departing 
from normative capitalization is that capitalization imposes high ad-
ministrative costs-compliance costs on taxpayers and enforcement 
costs on the Service-and these costs often exceed the benefit of nor-
mative capitalization. Administrative costs undoubtedly outstrip ben-
efits in certain cases, although the administrative costs argument 
depends critically on unavailable empirical data. When evaluating the 
administrative costs argument, policymakers often will be forced to 
rely on experience, anecdotal evidence, and intuition. There are, how-
ever, cases where policymakers can reach firm conclusions. For exam-
ple, I develop a method of identifying cases where flaws in 
depreciation schedules are so severe that capitalization is unambigu-
ously bad without regard to administrative costs. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Section II introduces capital in-
come neutrality as the basic goal of capitalization rules and describes 
how capitalization and depreciation rules can operate in tandem to tax 
capital income neutrally. Section II also describes how the tax burden 
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on capital income is measured. Section III describes and critiques the 
arguments for limiting capitalization rules. Section IV concludes. 
II. CAPITAL INCOME NEUTRALITY 
A. Why Neutrality Matters 
An income tax that affects investor choice among assets is not neu-
tral. Suppose that there are two nearly identical assets, A and B, and 
that before tax the rate of return on both assets is 10%. If an income 
tax is imposed on A at a flat rate of 50%, but not on B, one would 
expect investors to shift capital from A to B until the after-tax rates of 
return from the two assets equilibrate. This would occur, for example, 
if the pretax return from assets A and Breached 14 % and 7 %, respec-
tively. If, instead, a 25% tax applied to both assets, the 10% pretax 
return on both assets would be reduced to 7.5% after tax. Because 
the rates of return remained equal, no tax-induced investment shift 
would occur. Thus, this tax would be neutral.4 
Neutrality is important because it leads to an efficient allocation of 
capital.5 Assets A and B provide an equal benefit to society and 
should be produced in the same proportion; if, however, the tax law 
treats them differently, they will be produced in different proportions. 
This inefficiency results in welfare loss. The tax makes taxpayers who 
act other than in accordance with their preferences worse off (here, 
taxpayers who switch to low-taxed asset B from high-taxed asset A 
even though, but for taxes, they would prefer asset A). And the gov-
ernment is no better off (the government raises no revenue from the 
taxpayers who switch since the tax rate on asset B is zero).6 
A perfectly neutral system would impose the same effective tax rate 
on all categories of capital investment.? The extent to which non-neu-
trality translates into inefficiency is a function of "substitution ef-
fects," or responses by taxpayers to differential taxation of competing 
4 E.g., Pamela B. Gann, Neutral Taxation of Capital Income: An Achievable Goal?, 48 
Law & Con temp. Probs. 77, 108 (1985). 
5 E.g., Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Prac-
tice 283-84 (5th ed. 1989); Gann, note 4, at 108; David F. Bradford & Treasury Dep't, 
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 46 (2d ed., rev. 1984) [hereinafter Blueprints]; 1 Treasury 
Dep't, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 5, 13 (1984); see also 
David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short-Term 
Intangibles, 33 J. Legal Stud. 199,208-09 (2004) [hereinafter Measurement] ("Optimal tax 
theories may indicate that some deviation from neutrality is desirable, but the size of the 
adjustments tends to be sufficiently small and of uncertain direction, and the benefits suffi-
ciently minimal, that most economists assume that neutrality is best."). 
6 David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 1627, 1650-53 & n.100 (1999) [hereinafter Line Drawing]. 
7 Musgrave & Musgrave, note 5, at 283. 
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investments.s Familiar economic assumptions of perfect markets hold 
that investors are fully informed profit-maximizers who are com-
pletely responsive to changes in after-tax rates of return. In this hypo-
thetical world, taxpayers always substitute low-taxed commodities for 
high-taxed commodities until after-tax returns equilibrate.9 
Real world markets are not perfect, however. In the face of differ-
ential taxation of competing investments taxpayers do not always sub-
stitute high- for low-taxed investments until after-tax returns reach 
equilibrium. Neutrality is still an important policy goal even in cases 
where differential taxation does not skew taxpayer behavior, since 
neutrality is important for a second reason: Non-neutrality results in 
inequity where markets do not fully adjust for the tax-favored status 
conferred on a given investment For instance, if a 50% tax is imposed 
on asset A and no tax is imposed on asset B, experience shows, para-
doxically, that the tax will affect the after-tax returns on A and B, but 
not to the point of complete equilibrium. lO For instance, the pretax 
return on asset A might rise to 12 % and the pretax return on asset B 
might fall to 8%, so the after-tax returns are 6% and 8% for A and B. 
Since, by hypothesis, the two assets are nearly identical, there is no 
reason why the owner of A should wind up 25% worse off after taxes 
than the owner of B .11 
B. The Building Blocks of Capital Income Neutrality-Normative 
Capitalization and Economic Depreciation 
Income, according to the accretion (or Haig-Simons) definition, 
equals consumption plus accumulation.12 That portion of accumula-
8 Id. 
9 Weisbach, Line Drawing, note 6, at 1652-54 (defining an efficient tax as a tax that does 
not distort investor choice among investments and explaining that the definition assumes 
perfect markets). 
10 E.g., Merle Erikson, Austan Goolsbee & Edward Maydew, How Prevalent Is Tax 
Arbitrage? Evidence From the Market for Municipal Bonds, 56 Nat'l Tax J. 259 (2003). 
Some economists have argued that the case for improving neutrality to promote economic 
efficiency is weak, but even they have conceded that improving neutrality might "con-
tribut[e] to the perceived fairness of the tax system." Lawrence H. Summers, Should Tax 
Reform Level the Playing Field?, in 1986 Proceedings of the 79th Ann. Conf. on Tax'n 119 
(Stanley J. Bowers ed.). 
11 Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive 
Out Inequities?, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 735, 742 (1979). 
12 David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 16 (1999); Henry C. Simons, Personal 
Income Taxation 50 (1938). It could be argued that the accretion income concept is not 
apposite when examining the taxation of businesses-particularly those operating in cor-
porate form-because the definition was aimed at the taxation of individuals, not busi-
nesses, and particularly not businesses to which a separate entity-level tax applies. See 
Simons, supra, at 61-62, 206. Nevertheless, the accretion definition can be adapted to fit 
this situation, by replacing consumption with transfers to (and receipts from) investors, but 
leaving unaltered the accretion component of the familiar Haig-Simons definition, the por-
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tion from the return to savings is referred to as capital income.13 Tax-
ing capital income neutrally depends critically on two fundamental 
building blocks, capitalization and depreciation.l4 
In an income tax, the function of normative capitalization rules is to 
identify instances where the taxpayer incurs an expense (whether in 
the form of a cash outlay, a purchase on credit, or part of a barter 
transaction) but does not suffer a diminution in wealth because the 
expense procures something with lasting value. Normative capitaliza-
tion does not depend on the form of the investment: An outlay 
should be capitalized whether it is for a building, a piece of equip-
ment, a quantity of natural resources, a contract right, or intangible 
value created through advertising or research and experimentation, 
and so forth, so long as the thing procured has lasting value.15 
When capitalization is required, the cost of acquiring the asset (or 
right, or future benefit, as the case may be) forms the taxpayer's basis 
in the asset-the cost is suspended in an account representing either 
deductions to be allowed in the future, an offset to the amount real-
ized when computing gain (or loss) on sale, or some of each.16 Depre-
ciation deductions generally are allowed as the capital asset declines 
tion of the definition that includes capital income. Leon Gabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, The 
Implications of the Economic Concept of Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income 
Tax Systems, 27 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 895,915 (1977) ("Corporate economic income is the 
algebraic sum of (1) distribution to investors, less advances from investors, and (2) the 
change in the value of its net worth during the income period."). 
13 William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a 
Broad-Based Consumption Tax, in 11 Tax Poi. & Econ. 1,2 (James M. Poterba ed., 1997); 
Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 Tax 
L. Rev. 17, 23 (1996). Capital income (sometimes referred to as income from nonhuman 
capital) stands in contrast to income from human capital, which includes wage income, and 
the value of services performed for one's self, the value of opportunity to earn wage in-
come, and the value of choice. Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Taxation and Human Capital, 13 Am. 
J. Tax Pol'y 189, 189 (1996). 
14 Capital income has been deconstructed into four components: (1) the return to wait-
ing, (2) the return to risk taking, (3) economic profit, and (4) realizations differing from 
expectations. Gentry & Hubbard, note 13, at 1. An income tax can capture only the re-
turn to waiting, not the latter three components, which comprise the bulk of capital in-
come. E.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax 
and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 377, 387-
88 (1992). Although this phenomenon has important policy implications, for example 
whether to move to a consumption tax, it does not negate the importance of capitalization 
and depreciation to the taxation of capital income in an income tax. In a system that places 
a nominal burden on capital income, properly designed capitalization and depreciation 
rules promote efficiency and equity. 
15 Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an As-
set, 15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 443, 450 (1974) ("[C]apitalization is a basic principle of 
income taxation rather than a technical requirement imposed by specific statutory 
language .... "). 
16 See IRC § 1012 (basis equals cost). To the extent capitalization is not required, a 
second determination must be made, specifically, whether the cost is deductible; the an-
swer to this second question is usually yes, at least for business taxpayers. IRC § 162. 
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in value over timeP The combination of normative capitalization 
rules and economic depreciation18 achieves a matching of income and 
related expenses and an accurate periodic measurement of net 
income.19 
Capitalization is a binary determination: Capitalization is either re-
quired or it is not.2° In contrast, depreciation schedules are set across 
a continuum with a limit at only one end, where depreciation is al-
lowed currently and in full. From this point, the period of deprecia-
tion can be stretched to infinity and the pattern of depreciation can be 
allowed in endless variations. Because the depreciation continuum is 
bounded at one end but not the other, the range of possible errors 
caused by flaws in depreciation rules is asymmetrical-it is possible 
for depreciation schedules to be set infinitely too long, but deprecia-
tion schedules cannot be set more than 100% too short.21 
As capitalization and depreciation rules operate in tandem and vari-
ations in depreciation rules are infinite, the combination of capitaliza-
tion and depreciation rules is also infinite. It is useful, however, to 
identify the three basic patterns in which capitalization and deprecia-
tion rules interrelate. First, a capital cost might be misidentified as a 
deductible expense. When this occurs, depreciation rules have no role 
to play, since without capitalization no basis is created and there is 
nothing to depreciate. (The converse of the first pattern-misidenti-
fying a deductible expense as a capital cost-is also possible, though 
this seldom occurs in practice.) In the second pattern, a capital cost is 
identified correctly, but the depreciation rules allow basis to be recov-
ered currently. Usually, this is the result of a policy determination 
that depreciation rules should be used as a subsidy to encourage capi-
tal investment.22 In the third pattern, a capital cost is identified cor-
17 IRC §§ 167-168. 
18 Economic depreciation is defined below. See note 32 and accompanying text. 
19 "Matching" costs and related expenses over time is fundamental to financial account-
ing. Although matching describes the result achieved by normative capitalization and de-
preciation rules, matching for the sake of matching is not, properly understood, the goal of 
capitalization and depreciation rules. Rather, the goal is accurately measuring net income. 
Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Tax Matching Principle as a Tax Value, 15 Am. J. Tax 
Pol'y 17,46 (1998). Depreciation systems that do not match income and related expenses 
can accurately measure net income, although no such system has been implemented. For 
example, Alan Auerbach and Dale Jorgenson have proposed allowing taxpayers a lump 
sum deduction in the year an asset is purchased equal to the present value of depreciation 
deductions that would be allowed if capitalization and economic depreciation were re-
quired. This proposal would measure net income over the asset's life accurately, but would 
not match income and related expenses temporally. Alan Auerbach & Dale Jorgenson, 
Inflation-Proof Depreciation of Assets, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 113. 
20 Of course, a cost could be bifurcated so only some portion must be capitalized. 
21 Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 5. 
22 See, e.g., IRC § 179 (small business expensing); § 168(k) (bonus depreciation); H.R. 
Rep. 108-94, at 23 (2003) ("The Committee believes that increasing and extending the 
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rectly and the depreciation schedule allows for capital cost recovery 
over some finite number of tax periods. . 
The first two patterns result from application of different rules but 
are otherwise identical. In both cases expensing is permitted. Ex-
pensing a cost that should be capitalized is economically equivalent, 
under certain conditions, to exempting the yield on the capital invest-
ment from tax.23 The important difference between the third pattern 
and the first two is that capital income bears some tax burden only 
under the third pattern. Where capitalization is required, the extent 
of the burden on capital income depends on the length and pattern of 
the applicable depreciation schedule and the nominal tax rate. 
Thus, taxation of capital income depends on both capitalization 
rules and depreciation rules. Flaws in either capitalization rules (mis-
identifying a capital cost as a deductible one or vice versa) or depreci-
ation rules (an unduly long or short recovery period, or recovery at 
the wrong pace within the designated period, or both) can cause over-
or undertaxation of capital income. Unless the flaws are consistent 
across all capital assets, which is never the case, non-neutrality re-
sults.24 (It is also possible for flaws in capitalization rules and depreci-
ation rules to offset, so that the resulting tax burden on capital income 
is more neutral than is implied by either set of rules considered 
alone.25) 
Most commentators agree that the proper way to evaluate the rela-
tive neutrality of tax rules is the internal rate of return approach.26 
Under this approach, neutrality is judged by comparing how taxes 
change the internal rates of return of competing investments. A tax 
system that causes the same percentage reduction in the internal rates 
of return for all assets is considered neutral.27 In the economics litera-
additional first-year depreciation will accelerate purchases of equipment, promote capital 
investment, modernization, and growth, and will help to spur an economic recovery."). 
23 E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in Income, 
Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen 300 (1948); Michael 
J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation, Principles and Policies 287-92 
(rev. 4th ed. 2002) (providing examples and explaining the conditions necessary for the 
equivalency to hold). 
24 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of The Public Sector 548 (2d ed. 1998) ("no economy 
has ever imposed a uniform tax on capital income"). 
25 For instance, if 90% of some capital investment were required to be capitalized, the 
taxpayer would derive a benefit from being able to expense the other 10%. Stretching the 
depreciation deductions on the 90% of the cost that was capitalized over an uneconomi-
cally long period would mitigate this benefit however. Cf. Musgrave & Musgrave, note 5, 
at 383 (explaining that many different combinations of depreciation schedules and tax rates 
can be set that will produce equivalent tax burdens in present value terms). 
26 See, e.g., id. at 384-85; Mackie, note 2, at 294; Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 10-
12. Some economists use an alternative measure, the rental cost of capital, though this 
measure leads to flawed conclusions in certain cases as discussed below. See Section III.D. 
27 See Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 13, 18-19. 
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ture, the metric used to evaluate tax systems based on the internal rate 
of return approach is the marginal effective tax rate (hereinafter "ef-
fective tax rate"), which is the percentage reduction in the internal 
rate of return caused by taxes.28 
A tax system that imposed a neutral burden on capital income 
would impose equal effective tax rates on all capital assets.29 A neu-
trality-enhancing policy change is one that reduces the disparity in ef-
fective tax rates among assets.30 
The effective tax rate takes into account both the tax costs and tax 
benefits of holding an asset. Because the tax benefit of depreciation 
deductions varies depending on both the length of the depreciation 
schedule and the pattern of depreciation allowed over that schedule, 
for a given nominal tax rate, the effective tax rate will change as either 
the length or the pattern of the depreciation schedule changes.31 The 
length and pattern of depreciation deductions that cause the effective 
tax rate to equal the nominal rate is known as economic depreciation, 
which requires that the depreciation deduction allowed in every pe-
riod match exactly the decline in the property's value during that 
period.32 
It generally is accepted that economic depreciation for tangible as-
sets is geometric, that is, decay in value proceeds at a constant per-
centage rate.33 Depreciation schedules that allow depreciation 
deductions on either on a straight line (ratable) or accelerated declin-
ing balance basis34 cause the effective tax rate to be less than the nom-
inal rate even· where the tax depreciation schedule matches the 
economic useful life of the asset. The same is true when depreciation 
schedules are too short (to an inconsistent degree) relative to eco-
nomic usefullives.35 
28 Musgrave & Musgrave, note 5, at 384. The marginal effective tax rate technically is 
the difference between the pretax and post-tax internal rates of return on the investment 
divided by the pretax internal rate of return. 
29 Treasury Dep't, Report to the Congress on Depreciation Recovery Periods and Meth-
ods 35 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Treasury Study] ("Neutrality refers to the degree to which 
a tax system imposes a uniform marginal effective tax rate on all investments."); Jane G. 
Gravelle & Jack Taylor, Tax Neutrality and the Tax Treatment of Purchased Intangibles, 45 
Nat'l Tax. J. 77, 81-82 (1992). 
30 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 35 ("Starting from a nonneutral tax system that im-
poses different marginal effective tax rates on different investments, a tax change is said to 
promote neutrality to the extent that it reduces the variation of marginal effective tax rates 
across investments."). 
31 See id. at 38. 
32 Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant 
Valuations, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 604,606 (1964) ("[T]he only sensible definition of depreciation 
relevant to measurement of true money income is putative decline in economic value. "). 
33 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 111-13. 
34 See, e.g., IRC § 168(b). 
35 E.g., Mackie, note 2, at 308. 
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Finally, it is important to note that capital income neutrality is dis-
tinct from and does not depend on taxation of income from capital at 
the nominal tax rate. It is possible, perhaps even desirable, to have a 
system of capitalization and depreciation rules that at the same time 
taxes capital income neutrally and gives a tax preference to capital 
income vis-a-vis other forms of income such as wages.36 From the 
point of view of capital income neutrality, the important feature of the 
tax system is that all classes of capital are taxed at the same effective 
tax rate, not that the effective rate is set equal to the nominal rate.37 
A set of depreciation schedules that are uniformly too short relative to 
economic depreciation thus would be fully consistent with capital in-
come neutrality. 
III. ANALYZING THE ARGUMENTS 
Commentators have offered six distinct arguments for departing 
from normative capitalization rules. Each argument includes one or 
more of the following claims: (1) some unanswered empirical ques-
tion defeats any reasonable expectation that moving closer to norma-
tive capitalization rules will enhance neutrality; (2) the administrative 
burden of normative capitalization rules exacts a higher price on the 
tax system than do the nonneutralities that result from nonnormative 
capitalization rules; or (3) some feature of the tax system 
counterbalances the nonneutrality introduced by flawed capitalization 
rules. All the arguments are premised on the theory of second best:38 
Each argument reduces to a claim that given a certain constraint, the 
optimal set of capitalization rules differs from the normative ideal. I 
consider each argument in turn. 
A. Uneconomic Depreciation 
Some have argued that departing from normative capitalization 
rules is warranted where capitalization is followed by an uneconomic 
depreciation schedule because in these instances, capitalization is 
more trouble than it is worth.39 This argument has been advanced 
36 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 38-39. 
37 See id. 
38 Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. 
L. Rev. 925, 983·84 (1967); R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Sec-
ond Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11 (1956). 
39 Gunn, note 15, at 492-93 ("In the absence of a feasible method of amortizing costs ... , 
a current deduction may be preferable to capitalization as a method of clearly reflecting 
income."); Lee, note 1, at 350-52 (arguing that capitalization followed by slow or no depre-
ciation is not worth the trouble and urging that "[t]his 'second best' approach" of allowing 
costs that should be capitalized to be deducted because of uneconomic depreciation "is 
demanded by clear reflection of income as a rule of equity or rough justice"); id. at 345 
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primarily in the context of costs incurred to produce intangible capital 
to justify expensing items like advertising, employee training, and 
packaging design.40 Proponents of this argument claim it is impossible 
to estimate with any degree of accuracy how long the benefits that 
flow from expenditures of this sort willlast.41 Consequently, depreci-
ation schedules allowing for the recovery of any capitalized cost can-
not be set in a way that would enhance neutrality (as compared with 
expensing).42 Therefore, proponents argue, expensing is justified be-
cause there is no reason to expect that capitalization and depreciation 
will promote efficiency and equity.43 In other words, capitalization 
coupled with sufficiently uneconomic depreciation is worse than 
expensing. 
This argument is appealing intuitively and underlies the view held 
by some that resolution of capitalization controversies should be influ-
enced by the availability and timing of the depreciation deductions 
that will be allowed if capitalization is required, rather than solely by 
reference to the question whether the cost in question will produce a 
future benefit.44 Proponents of the argument usually frame their anal-
ysis in terms of the depreciation deductions allowed under current 
law, rather than testing the argument against the best possible depre-
ciation schedule that could be designed given empirical and practical 
limitations on designing such schedules.45 And they have cut short 
their analysis before considering the range of situations where practi-
cal limitations on setting depreciation schedules (as opposed to limita-
tions imposed by current law) make nonnormative capitalization rules 
a second-best optimum.46 No one has explored the extent to which 
the argument is persuasive if the policymaker is assumed to have the 
ability (within practical boundaries) to optimize both capitalization 
and depreciation rules. This Subsection fills that gap. I conclude that 
n.349 ("My notion that capitalization without depreciation produces more distortion than a 
current deduction has become conventional wisdom."); Case Comment, An Analysis of 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 1505, 1516-19 (1993). 
40 Lee, note 1, at 343·45, 355. 
41 Id. at 345. 
42 Id. 
43 See note 39. 
44 E.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1,20-23 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that it was inappropriate to capitalize the cost of a truck that would last 10 
years into the taxpayer's basis in a building with a 40-year tax depreciation schedule); Lee, 
note 1, at 354 & n.405, 351 & n.386 (espousing this view and citing cases where the courts 
were persuaded by this argument). 
45 See, e.g., Lee, note 1, at 350-52. 
46 E.g., id; Gunn, note 15, at 492 (acknowledging that "[i]deally, the costs of a special 
advertising campaign, or of training employees in new techniques, or of obtaining new 
customers should be capitalized and amortized over whatever period results in matching 
those costs against the revenues they were incurred to produce," but concluding that "it is 
inconceivable that amortization of such costs would be allowed") (emphasis added). 
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practical difficulties in setting depreciation schedules do justify a de-
parture from normative capitalization but only in certain cases. 
Assuming a policymaker has an unlimited ability to design both 
capitalization and depreciation rules (so questions of political feasibil-
ity are put to one side), the policymaker will encounter difficult 
problems when attempting to design neutrality-enhancing deprecia-
tion rules. Lack of empirical information about certain assets might 
make it impossible to design a depreciation schedule for such assets 
close enough to economic depreciation so that capitalization and u.se 
of that best possible schedule would result in greater neutrality than 
expensing. Even when a depreciation .schedule can be set close 
enough to economic depreciation for a given asset so that capitaliza-
tion and depreciation will be neutrality-enhancing (when compared 
with expensing), limitations on the design of administrable, system-
wide depreciation rules might make expensing a better policy choice 
than capitalization and depreciation. For example, grouping hetero-
geneous assets into classes and assigning depreciation schedules class 
by class, rather than asset by asset, results in nonneutral taxation of 
dissimilar assets classed together, yet grouping is considered a practi-
cal necessity.47 Even if a depreciation system can be designed that 
overcomes such impediments, capitalization and use of this deprecia-
tion system might not be worth the candle if the incremental benefit 
from using the system (that is, greater efficiency and equity reSUlting 
from the neutrality enhancement) is smaller than the added cost of 
designing and administering the system. 
In the remainder of this Subsection I first demonstrate that a depre-
ciation schedule for a given asset need not be perfect to be neutrality-
enhancing. Indeed, even a depreciation schedule many times longer 
than the useful life of the asset in question might be neutrality-en-
hancing when compared with expensing. Then I discuss the principal 
difficulties in setting depreciation rules, including the need (but, for 
some assets at least, the inability) to determine the useful lives of as-
sets, problems caused by grouping assets into classes, and the problem 
of designing depreciation rules that account for asset price risk. Fi-
nally, I discuss how the administrative costs of requiring capitalization 
and depreciation should factor into the policymaker's calculus. 
1. Determining the Tolerance for Error in Setting Depreciation 
Schedules 
A neutrality-enhancing change is one that reduces variation in ef-
fective tax rates across assets. Capitalization is superior to expensing, 
47 See text accompanying notes 87-100. 
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provided that capitalization is followed by a pattern depreciation over 
a schedule that will result in a deviation in the effective tax rate (as 
compared with some benchmark effective tax rate determined to be 
the neutral rate) smaller than the deviation in the effective tax rate 
that is caused by expensing (when the zero effective tax rate that re-
sults from expensing is compared with the same neutral benchmark 
rate).48 Any such depreciation schedule is (at least) minimally accept-
able. The most flawed tax depreciation schedule that is still minimally 
acceptable sets the tolerance for error. 
Suppose that the economic depreciation schedule for a given as-
set-used in this example ,as the benchmark-is five years and the 
nominal tax rate is 35%; the effective tax rate also will be 35%.49 Ex-
pensing the cost of this asset would drive the effective tax rate for this 
asset to zero, a 35 percentage points deviation from the benchmark 
(from 35% to zero). A depreciation schedule that causes a deviation 
in the effective tax rate of less than 35 percentage points (resulting in 
an effective tax rate greater than zero and less than 70%) would en-
hance neutrality as compared with expensing and therefore would be 
within the tolerance for error. 
If the cash flows from a project are known, the tolerance for error 
in setting minimally acceptable depreciation schedules can be com-
puted mathematically. Using simple examples, I demonstrate that the 
tolerance for error is high, probably higher than most commentators 
believe, though no one has yet sought to quantify it. In the following 
examples, I hypothesize an expenditure that results in a benefit for n 
years, beginning in the year following the expenditure; and I assume 
the neutral effective tax rate is the effective tax rate that results from 
capitalization and use of straight line depreciation over the asset's use-
fullife, that is, straight line depreciation over n years. I call this neu-
tral effective tax rate the benchmark rate.50 (Because I am using 
straight line depreciation, rather than economic depreciation, the 
benchmark rate is slightly less than the nominal rate, and it changes, 
but only slightly, for assets with different useful lives.51 ) I then test 
how the effective tax rate changes as the depreciation schedule is ex-
tended to gauge how far from a given asset's actual useful life the 
48 See note 30 and accompanying text. 
49 If depreciation is economic, the effective tax rate equals the nominal tax rate. See 
note 32 and accompanying text. 
50 Following Weisbach, I use straight line depreciation when computing the neutral 
benchmark rate to keep the math simple, but the results would not change under realistic 
patterns of depreciation. Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 14. 
51 In the examples below, for instance, I assume straight line depreciation is allowed for 
assets that produce income in an even pattern alternatively over three, five, and ten years; 
given a nominal tax rate of 35%, the resulting effective tax rates are 34.45%, 33.95%, and 
32.84%, respectively. 
Imaged with th Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 561 2003-2004
2004] CAPITALIZATION EXCEPTIONS 561 
policymaker can set the tax depreciation schedule and still produce a 
result more neutral than expensing. 
Consider the following. A taxpayer spends $400 currently on a 
seminar for its employees that will produce $100 in pretax returns for 
each of the following five years. Normative capitalization rules would 
require the $400 upfront cost to be capitalized, since it produces a 
future benefit. If the taxpayer must capitalize the cost of the seminar 
and is allowed depreciation deductions over five years on a straight 
line basis, the effective tax rate is 33.95%, assuming a flat nominal rate 
of 35%. If the cost is expensed, the effective tax rate is zero.52 
Expensing is an extreme response to the difficulty of determining 
the lifespan of the benefits of the seminar, and results in a 33.95 per-
cent~ge points (that is, a 100%) change from the benchmark effective 
tax rate resulting from straight line depreciation over five years.53 The 
other extreme response is "perpetual capitalization," where the cost 
of the seminar is capitalized and cannot be recovered until the busi-
ness is either dissolved (at which time the capitalized cost would be 
deducted)54 or sold (at which time the capitalized cost would offset 
the sale proceeds).55 If capitalization is in fact perpetual (that is, no 
depreciation deductions are ever allowed),56 the effective tax rate is 
183 %? Thus, perpetual capitalization causes a deviation from neu-
trality of 149 percentage points, over four times greater than the 
deviation caused by expensing.58 If these two extreme solutions were 
the only options, the argument that expensing should be allowed is 
clearly correct. 
Consider what would happen, though, if depreciation were .not dis-
allowed completely but merely delayed. How long would the tax de-
preciation schedule of the seminar have to be extended to result in a 
greater deviation from the benchmark rate than the 33.95 percentage 
52 This assumes the scope conditions for the equivalency between expensing and yield 
exemption to hold are not violated. Graetz & Schenk, note 23, at 290-91 (describing 
conditions). 
53 Regardless of the effective tax rate under the benchmark case, expensing will always 
result in a 100% change in the effective tax rate so long as the scope conditions for the 
expensing-yield exemption equivalency to hold are not violated. 
54 See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992) ("where no specific 
asset or useful life can be ascertained, [capitalized costs are] deducted upon dissolution of 
the enterprise"). 
55 IRC § 1001(a). 
56 The computation described in the text assumes that neither a sale or dissolution oc-
curs for such a long time that the present value of the benefit is nil. 
57 The pretax internal rate of return is 7.93%. The after-tax internal rate of return is 
negative 6.54%; it is negative because the sum of the after-tax cash flows (5 x $65 = $325) is 
less than the initial investment of $400. The effective tax rate is computed as follows: 
[7.93% - (-6.54%)] ... 7.93% = 183% (rounded). 
58 183% - 34% = 149%. 
Imaged with th Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 562 2003-2004
562 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: 
points deviation caused by expensing? The answer is 29 years if de-
preciation is allowed on a straight line basis,59 implying a tolerance for 
error in setting the depreciation schedule of up to 23 years. There-
fore, if the lifespan of the benefits from the seminar can be estimated 
even very roughly, expensing cannot be justified on the ground that it 
results in greater neutrality (that is, results in a smaller disparity in 
effective tax rates) than capitalization followed by depreciation. 
To get a rough sense of how this result changes as the useful life of 
the capital asset in question changes, suppose the facts are varied so 
that, alternatively, the seminar's benefit lasts for three or ten years, 
rather than five. In the 10-year case, assume that there is a $100 in-
crease in pretax returns for each subsequent year. The cost is adjusted 
so the internal rate of return from the seminars that last three and ten 
years continues to be 7.93%, as it was for the seminar that lasted five 
years. Thus, the seminars providing three- and ten-year benefits are 
assumed to cost $258 and $673, respectively. For expensing to domi-
nate capitalization and depreciation of the three- and ten-year semi-
nars, depreciation must be stretched over more than 17 and 64 years, 
respectively.60 In these three examples, depreciation schedules five 
and even six times longer than the economic life of the asset in ques-
tion are within the tolerance for error.61 
These examples held constant the pretax rate of return of the semi-
nar when the depreciation schedule was altered. It is reasonable to 
assume that the demand for and thus the price of seminars would 
change depending on the length of the depreciation schedule, since 
59 If depreciation is allowed over 28 years on 'a straight line basis, then the effective tax 
rate equals 67.4%, just under a 34 percentage point change from the benchmark of 34% 
(the effective tax rate if straight line depreciation is allowed over five years). Stretching 
the depreciation schedule out for one more year to 29 years, the effective tax rate is slightly 
above 68%, which amounts to over a 34 percentage points change from the 34% bench-
mark rate. 
60 A seminar costing $258.03 and providing a $100 benefit for the following three years 
has a pretax internal rate of return of 7.93%. The effective tax rate for the three-year 
seminar is 34.45%, assuming straight line depreciation is allowed over three years. See 
note 51. Holding the price of the seminar constant and allowing depreciation over 18 
years, the after-tax internal rate of return is 2.46%. The effective tax rate is 68.96%, com-
puted as follows: (7.93% - 2.46%) + 7.93%. The change in effective tax rates is over a 
34.45 percentage points change from the 34.45% benchmark rate, and therefore exceeds 
the tolerance for error. 
The effective tax rate for the lO-year seminar assuming depreciation is allowed over 10 
years is 32.84%. See note 51. Holding the price of the seminar constant and allowing 
depreciation over 65 years, the after-tax internal rate of return is 2.71 %. The effective tax 
rate is 65.86%, computed as follows: (7.93% - 2.71 %) + 7.93%. The change in effective tax 
rates is over a 32.84 percentage points change from the 32.84% benchmark rate, and there-
fore exceeds the tolerance for error. 
61 The tolerance for error in setting depreciation schedules for the three- , five- , and 
ten-year assets is 5.7, 5.8, and 6.4 times the economic life of those assets, respectively. 
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the depreciation schedule affects the after-tax rate of return, which is 
the most important factor for investors.62 A more complex model 
could be designed-one that adjusts the price depending on the pre-
sent value of the allowable depreciation deductions-though such a 
model would have to include an assumption regarding taxpayer re-
sponse to a change in depreciation rules, which would be extremely 
difficult to predict.63 There is no a priori reason to conclude that the 
implied tolerance for error in setting the length of depreciation sched-
ules would be less than the one under my more simplistic model. In-
deed, there is good reason to think that the opposite would be true; 
that is, a more complex model would imply a substantially greater tol-
erance for error.64 
These examples are highly stylized. It seems unreasonable, for in-
stance, to assume, as the examples did, that the benefits of a seminar 
(or of advertising, to take two common examples of items with respect 
to which the argument under consideration has been advanced) are 
reaped in a level pattern, and that they provide no current benefit 
(that is, no benefit in the year the cost is incurred). When a cost pro-
duces both a current and a future benefit, the extent of the current 
benefit is key because expensing is appropriate with respect to the 
portion of the cost producing the current benefit. It is also impossible 
in practice to determine the actual pattern of economic depreciation 
for most capital assets (especially intangible capital) since it is not ob-
62 If the pretax cost of the seminar is fixed, as the depreciation schedule is lengthened, 
the after-tax cost of the seminar rises since the present value of the depreciation deduc-
tions declines. Compressing the depreciation schedule will have the opposite effect. See 
Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 12-13 (proposing a similar model that adjusts asset 
price as the present value of the depreciation deductions change). 
63 Predicting changes in behavior as a result of tax changes is a confounding problem. 
Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 670 (1995) 
(discussing the difficulty of "anticipating changes in behavior that will be induced by 
changes in the tax law"). 
64 A model proposed by David Weisbach assumes that the price of an asset will fully 
reflect the tax benefit of accelerated depreciation (or, conversely, the tax detriment of 
delayed depreciation). Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 12-13. Making this assumption 
in the context of the five-year seminar used in the example, the depreciation schedule must 
be lengthened to over 61 years for the percentage change in effective tax rates to surpass 
the 100% change caused by expensing. This is more than a two-fold increase over the 29-
year result yielded by my simpler model that holds the price constant as the depreciation 
schedule changes. As discussed above, economists have shown that markets adjust-
though not completely-for the tax-favored status conferred on certain investments. See 
notes 10-11 and accompanying text. If, as is likely, markets adjust by lowering prices-but 
only in part-for the tax detriment of uneconomically long depreciation schedules, the 
tolerance for error in setting depreciation schedules will be greater than my model 
predicts. Designing a realistic model depends on the sensitivity of consumer behavior to 
changes in depreciation schedules, which is extremely difficult to predict. See Graetz, note 
63, at 670. 
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servable directly. Thus, as a practical matter, computing the accept-
able tolerance for error is usually impossible. 
Still, given the difficulty of determining the pattern of economic de-
preciation for certain assets and the incremental administrative costs 
that follow from capitalization, to take just two of the difficult issues 
discussed below that the policymaker will encounter, developing a re-
fined estimate of the tolerance for error in setting depreciation sched-
ules should be less important to the policymaker than developing the 
intuition that the tolerance for error is high. And, given a rough sense 
of the high tolerance for error, policymakers should not jump to the 
conclusion that capitalization is more trouble than it is worth65 with-
out first examining whether neutrality-enhancing depreciation rules 
can be established. I turn to that issue now. 
2. Difficulties in Setting Adequate Depreciation Schedules 
The argument that an inability to set acceptable depreciation sched-
ules justifies expensing is most compelling in the context of in-
tangibles. The argument has little persuasive force, however, in the 
context of most tangible assets-the consensus view of commentators 
is that adequate depreciation schedules for tangible assets can be (and 
some argue have been) set.66 In a large scale study published in 2000, 
Treasury estimated the effective tax rates under current law of various 
classes of capital used by corporations.67 Figure 1 shows Treasury's 
conclusions. 
The first five categories of assets in Figure 1 are all tangible assets 
for which capitalization is required. The variation in the effective tax 
rates among these five categories is attributable to flaws in deprecia-
tion schedules.68 Others have considered the issues relating to tangi-
ble asset depreciation and have reached firm conclusions that (1) 
depreciation policy is intended to and in fact does operate as a subsidy 
to encourage capital formation,69 and (2) Congress could improve 
capital income neutrality with respect to tangible property if it chose 
to do so, though such a reform is not politically popular currently.70 
Some have even concluded (3) that the non-neutralities that result 
65 See note 39. 
66 See Gann, note 4, at 149. 
67 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 38. 
68 Id. (effective tax rate "differences reflect differences in cost recovery provisions and 
imply that the current cost recovery system is not neutral, because neutrality implies a 
common marginal effective tax rate on all investments"). 
69 Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Rev-
olutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 Tax. L. Rev. 725, 767 (1992). 
70 E.g., Gann, note 4, at 149 (concluding that substantially neutral taxation of tangible 
assets is an achievable goal). 
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FIGURE 1 
TREASURY ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES OF CORPORATE 
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS UNDER CURRENT LAW (AS OF 2000) 
~ 
~ 
---
" ~ 
>< 
.. 
E-< 
" .~ 
~ 
""" ~
~ 
S 
" ;> 
-< 
45 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Equipment Structures Public Inventories Land Intangibles Average 
Utilities 
Asset Category 
from flaws71 in depreciation rules as applied to tangible capital are not 
large enough to impose significant economic costs, suggesting they are 
not worth fixing.72 These conclusions all support the view that for tan-
gible capital assets the argument that normative capitalization should 
be relaxed given an inability to set adequate depreciation schedules is 
unpersuasive, since adequate depreciation schedules in fact can be set. 
The sixth category of assets, intangibles, presents a different story. 
As is readily apparent from Figure 1, intangibles are dramatically un-
dertaxed relative to the first five categories. This is the result of a 
breakdown in capitalization rules, not favorable depreciation al-
lowances.73 Under current law the cost of most intangible assets need 
not be capitalized.74 This implies that substantial improvement in 
neutrality could be achieved if the law required capitalization of the 
71 By "flaws," I mean departures from neutral depreciation rules. Thus, flaws include 
unintended errors that result from lack of necessary empirical data as well as departures 
intended to operate as a subsidy. 
72 E.g., 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 44 ("[S]everal analysts question whether re-
maining depreciation-induced tax differences across [tangible capital] investments within 
the business sector are large enough to impose significant economic costs."). 
73 Id. at 38 ("Because of expensing, corporate investment in intangibles face [sic] a very 
low 3.8 percent marginal effective tax rate."); id. at 38, n.143 ("To the extent that in-
tangibles are not expensed, they would face a higher marginal effective tax rate."). 
74 For some intangibles expenditures-most notably research and experimentation 
costs-capitalization is required but the depreciation schedules allow for expensing. IRC 
§ 174. As discussed above, whether expensing is allowed by capitalization rules or depreci-
ation rules makes no economic difference. See text accompanying note 23. 
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cost of intangibles. This is true, however, only if neutrality-enhancing 
depreciation schedules could be set for intangibles. 
To determine whether acceptable depreciation schedules can be set 
for intangibles, I leverage the extensive literature examining the prac-
tical limits on setting depreciation schedules for tangible assets I ex-
amine each of the practical difficulties encountered in setting 
depreciation schedules for tangible assets and explore whether each 
difficulty is likely to be more acute for intangibles. 
The first, most basic problem encountered in fashioning deprecia-
tion rules is measuring economic depreciation, which tracks decline in 
value over time. To determine economic depreciation, value must be 
measured periodically. Some economists have concluded that eco-
nomic depreciation of tangible assets can be measured based on trad-
ing prices in used asset markets.75 The fountainhead of the vast 
literature on this subject is in an empirical study that appeared in a 
series of papers published in the early 1980's by Charles Hulten and 
Frank Wykoff.76 Though the Hulten and Wykoff study is controver-
sial, economists generally consider it to provide sufficiently accurate 
information to establish neutral depreciation schedules.77 
Unfortunately, no study similar to Hulton and Wykoff's can be per-
formed for most intangible assets, given the absence of used asset 
markets. Business goodwill and a trained workforce, to take two ex-
amples, are not bought and sold like cars and buildings. When they 
do trade, they are exchanged as an inseparable part of a going busi-
ness, and it is difficult to determine how much of the overall purchase 
price is attributable to the business's constituent parts.78 
Facing this difficulty, economists have attempted to deduce the ex-
tent of any intertemporal benefits of intangibles expenditures by cor-
relating one period's expenditures for things like advertising or 
75 E.g., Charles R. Hulten & Frank C. Wykoff, The Measurement of Economic Depreci-
ation, in Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of Income From Capital 81, 82-83 
(Charles R. Hulten ed., 1981). 
76 Id.; 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 111-15 (surveying the economic literature evalu-
ating the Hulten and Wykoff study). 
77 E.g., 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 45-46; David W. Brazell & James B. Mackie III, 
Depreciation Lives and Methods: Current Issues in the U.S. Capital Cost Recovery Sys-
tem, 53 Nat'! Tax J. 531, 544 (2000). But see Summers, note 10, at 8 ("Hulten and Wycoff 
[sic] did as much as probably can be done with the data they had at their disposal. But it is 
appropriate to attach a great deal of uncertainty to their calculations."). 
78 Section 1060 is a rough-justice measure prescribing rules for allocating purchase price 
among assets, including goodwill and going concern value. It was enacted to quell contro-
versy between taxpayers and the Service that had arisen "principally because of the diffi-
culty of establishing the value of" such assets. S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 254 (1986), reprinted 
in 1986-3 C.B. 1, 254. The presence of a rule that establishes value for tax purposes does 
not imply that the economic value of intangibles could be established satisfactorily for 
depreciation purposes. 
Imaged with th Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 567 2003-2004
2004] CAPITALIZATION EXCEPTIONS 567 
research and development to subsequent period sales (or, in some in-
stances, the value of intangible assets held by a firm in subsequent 
periods).79 Although the results of these studies seemed promising at 
first, more recent economic studies conclude that no reliable method 
exists for gauging the durability of many forms of intangible capita1.80 
Thus, for intangible assets that do not trade in used asset markets, 
measuring economic depreciation is more problematic than it is for 
most tangible assets.81 
A second major problem in setting depreciation schedules is that 
administrative considerations force the use of depreciation schedules 
for groups (or classes) of assets, rather than individual assets.82 A sys-
tem that groups all assets into one of a limited number of categories 
with a fixed depreciation schedule is inherently simpler to administer 
than one that requires a particularized determination of the useful life 
and pattern of depreciation of all assets.83 Most taxpayers probably 
do not know the precise pattern of economic depreciation for the as-
sets they use in their businesses84 and, even if they did, it would be 
unrealistic to expect them to act with candor if required to supply this 
information as part of their periodic tax reporting. Allowing taxpay-
ers to report according to their own estimate of the useful lives of the 
assets they own likely would result in substantial non-neutralities and 
inequities (a consequence of undetected aggressive reporting positions 
by some taxpayers) absent a substantial increase in the audit rate, an 
expensive proposition. 
79 E.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Andrew M. Rosenfield, The Durability of Advertising 
Revisited, 42 J. Indus. Econ. 263 (1994). 
80 Id. at 275 (concluding that no model currently in existence can predict the durability 
of advertising or research and development costs); Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis 
of Advertising 31 (2002) (concluding that the effect of advertising on long-term profitabil-
ity is "difficult to determine and appears to vary across industries"); 2000 Treasury Study, 
note 29, at 31 ("The degree to which expenditures on advertising and research create long-
lived assets that depreciate is uncertain."). 
81 This is an overgeneralization. There are, to be sure, tangible assets for which there is 
no used asset market. To overcome this problem, Hulten and Wykoff extrapolated from 
data on those assets that did trade to determine the rate of economic depreciation of those 
assets that did not trade. Hulten & Wykoff, note 75, at 92-94; see also 2000 Treasury Study, 
note 29, at 113 (defending the accuracy of Hulten and Wykoffs extrapolation). 
82 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 74. 
83 See id. at 76. 
84 Id. at 74 ("individual taxpayers may not be the best evaluators of future asset obsoles-
cence"); id. at 121 (discussing prior Treasury studies that failed for lack of empirical data 
from taxpayers: "[O]nce an asset had been fully depreciated, the accounting records of 
many companies were not well suited to provide information on whether the asset was still 
owned by the company, and if so, where within the company it was located. [T]his ... 
suggests that rely[ing] heavily on the accounting records of the company ... should be 
viewed with caution."). 
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An alternative would be for the Service to determine depreciation 
schedules for each asset; however, this approach is impractical for sev-
eral reasons. First, there is no reason to expect the Service to have 
better information regarding the useful lives of taxpayers' assets than 
taxpayers themselves. Second, this approach would imply a more per-
vasive role for the Service in tax compliance than currently exists, 
which is likely to be politically unpopular and expensive. Third, the 
Service would have to hire additional economists and appraisers since 
the revenue agents currently employed likely lack the necessary skills 
to set depreciation schedules. Integrating these professionals into the 
Service's bureaucracy would be difficult and costly. Since neither tax-
payers nor the Service are well equipped to set depreciation schedules 
asset by asset, pragmatism dictates grouping assets into classes for 
which useful lives are established ex ante, either legislatively or by the 
Service.85 Experience bears out the conclusion that grouping avoids 
controversial, fact-based inquiries into the useful life of particular as-
sets that would result from an asset-by-asset approach.86 
Income measurement errors result from grouping heterogeneous 
assets into a single class.87 The extent of these errors is a function of 
the extent to which the depreciation patterns for assets classed to-
gether differ. For example, grouping together assets that depreciate 
economically over a term of between four and six years in a class with 
a five year tax depreciation schedule, would result in more accurate 
income measurement more often than would grouping together assets 
that depreciate economically over periods of between one and nine 
years. Thus, narrowly defined groups allow the useful life and pattern 
of depreciation for each group to be tailored more closely to the eco-
nomic depreciation of assets within that group.88 But narrowly de-
fined groups implies more groups. The greater the number of groups, 
the greater the number of potential controversies regarding how par-
ticular assets should be classified.89 Thus, the policymaker's goal in 
choosing the breadth and number of groups is to strike the right bal-
ance between the competing objectives of reducing controversies and 
85 E.g., id. at 76-77. 
86 Before 1981, the use of asset classes was not mandatory. Congress found pre-1981 
law "unnecessarily complicated" because it required "determinations on matters, such as 
useful life and salvage value, which are inherently uncertain and, thus, too frequently result 
in unproductive disagreements between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service." S. 
Rep. No. 97-144, at 47 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 412, 425. 
87 See 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 77. 
BS Id. at 76-77. 
89 Id. at 76 ("Defining asset classes narrowly would increase the number of asset classes 
in the depreciation system and would increase the number of classification controversies 
that would need to be resolved.") 
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minimizing the non-neutralities that result from heterogeneous 
groupmgs. 
Establishing a grouping system that is both administrable and suffi-
ciently accurate is an attainable goal for tangible assets since the het-
erogeneity of tangible property is not so pronounced that atomized 
(and therefore administratively unwieldy) groups are required. Cur-
rent law groups nearly all personal property into one of six asset clas-
ses with recovery periods ranging from three to twenty years.90 
Congress is content to group together, for example, a doctor's car 
used for house calls that travels a mere 5,000 miles per year, a pizza-
delivery truck that travels 10 times that far, and a pickup truck that 
routinely hauls tons of materials to job sites.91 It is unrealistic to think 
that the three vehicles will have identical useful lives. Nevertheless, 
Congress appears to have made a judgment that the variation in useful 
lives among the three assets is not so great that the resulting non-
neutrality is intolerable.92 
It is an open question whether grouping together intangibles also 
would be tolerable from the standpoint of both income measurement 
and tax administration. It is at least possible, if not likely, that the 
income-measurement problem from grouping will be more severe for 
intangible assets than for tangible assets if asset classes are to be suffi-
ciently broad to be administrable. 
Consider the case of advertising. It has long been widely accepted 
that advertising produces both current and substantial future bene-
fits.93 Under normative capitalization, therefore, advertising costs 
should be capitalized to the extent of the future benefit. Yet all adver-
tising is not alike. Some advertisements provide no current benefit. 
Examples include war-time advertisements for products not currently 
offered for sale,94 and advertisements for an event that is not set to 
90 IRC § 168(c). 
91 IRC § 168( e )(3)(B)(i). 
92 See notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
93 For example, economist Eugene Steuerle has said that a justification for requiring 
advertising to be capitalized is that "advertising is a capital expense and should be amor-
tized over a period of time," while others have argued that allowing advertising costs to be 
expensed gives "an unfair advantage to companies that invest principally in advertising, 
over those that invest mostly in plant and equipment." Alan Murray, Businesses Are Wor-
ried Over Impact of a Plan to Reduce Tax Break for Advertising Expenses, Wall St. J., Feb. 
28, 1986, at 54. 
94 For instance, during World War II, many manufacturers advertised their consumer 
products even though their entire productive capacity was devoted to military supplies. 
Slogans included "for war today-for your products tomorrow" or "when victory is 
achieved ... and consumer products are again more readily available ... you'll cherish the 
possession of this distinctive time piece." See Dale L. Flesher, Accounting for Advertising 
Costs, app. iv at 90-91 (1979) (ellipses in original) (reprinting of World War II print adver-
tisements). These advertisements were not intended to provide and indeed could not have 
provided any current benefit. Nevertheless, these costs were deductible (and still would be 
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occur until a future tax period. For example if the National Football 
League were a calendar year taxpayer, expenses incurred during the 
season (which runs from September through December) to increase 
attendance at the Super Bowl the following January would have no 
benefit during the year the costs are incurred.95 
On the other hand, some advertising produces only a current and 
no future benefit. For example, the benefit of expenditures by the 
concert promoter trumpeting the 10 Bruce Springsteen concerts held 
during the summer of 2003 at the Meadowlands Sports Complex in 
New Jersey were fully perishable, expiring worthless as soon as the 
concerts were over (or perhaps even sooner-as soon as the tickets 
sold out). Springsteen may have derived a future benefit from the 
promotion if, for example, he picked up new fans or the loyalty of 
existing fans intensified. So too may the Meadowlands Sports Com-
plex have derived a future benefit if concert goers found it a pleasant 
atmosphere and decide to go back based on their experience at one of 
his concerts. But for the concert promoter, there was no future bene-
fit.96 Between these polar cases there is a continuum representing dif-
ferent combinations of future and current benefits. 
How should advertising be grouped? Putting aside administrative 
considerations and the inherent difficulty of measuring the future ben-
efit from advertising, this question can be answered easily: All adver-
tisements with equal useful lives should be grouped together. The 
number of groups should be determined based on the range of useful 
lives observed in the marketplace. Yet there is reason to think that 
any more than one group might raise insoluble administrative 
problems. Suppose two groups were established: advertisements eli-
gible for expensing, and two-year advertisements. Under this system 
who is to determine the appropriate classification for a given adver-
tisement? Under the modified accelerated cost recovery system, the 
pickup truck in the foregoing example will be treated as five-year 
property (together with the doctor's car and the pizza delivery car) so 
deductible under current law). See Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, 1 Federal Taxa-
tion of Income, Estates and Gifts <JI 20.4.5 (3d ed. 1999) (dismissing the occasional sugges-
tion by courts that advertising in extraordinary cases may be a capital expense as 
"reminders that a sleeping dog exists" and suggesting that the Service's "long acquiescence 
in the deduction of advertising costs may have been implicitly ratified by congressional 
silence"). 
95 Advertisements promoting the NFL playoffs presumably heighten fans' interest in the 
regular season, since the regular season determines who makes the playoffs. I have in 
mind an advertisement directed just at potential Super Bowl attendees with time and place 
information, for example, that does not promote NFL football more generally. 
96 This assumes that the promoter is promoting this one concert series and advertising 
for this series will not help it attract attention to concerts in other cities in future taxable 
periods, which is possible. 
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long as the truck weighs no more than 13,000 pounds.97 But for most 
advertising there is no observable characteristic that could be used in 
a similar fashion to distinguish advertisements the cost of which 
should be expensed (those with no future benefit) from those the cost 
of which should be capitalized (those providing a future benefit).98 
Thus, although a multi-class depreciation system might be necessary 
for the class lives to be adequately congruent with the economic lives 
of the items classed together, administering a multi-class system for 
intangibles expenditures like advertising would pose serious adminis-
trative difficulties.99 
If a single asset class for all advertisements is the only practical solu-
tion, the NFL's Super Bowl advertisement, with no current benefit, 
and the concert promoter's advertisement, with only current benefit, 
would be grouped together. This would result inexorably in at least 
one of the two taxpayers being mistaxed. Whether the reSUlting non-
, neutrality is more pernicious than the non-neutrality that inevitably 
results from grouping together heterogeneous tangible assets is open 
to debate, but there is reason to think that it is. With respect to tangi-
ble asset depreciation, at least some distinctions are possible,lOo 
whereas any distinctions with respect to certain intangibles (such as 
the advertisements in the prior examples) appear impossible (or, at a 
minimum, administratively infeasible). 
Generalizing from the foregoing discussion, although grouping is a 
requirement of a workable depreciation scheme, grouping generally 
would be more problematic for intangible capital than it would be for 
tangible assets. The quality of being (at least potentially) "un-
groupable" is not unique to advertising. An attempt to establish asset 
classes for other intangibles such as employee training or research and 
experimentation is likely to encounter many of the same problems as 
those identified for grouping advertising. Intangible assets can be bro-
ken down into broad classes-for instance separating the benefits pro-
cured by advertising, research and experimentation, and employee 
training is possible since the costs of procuring these benefits are divis-
ible-but within each broad class, it may not be possible to create sub-
97 Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674. 
98 E.g., Landes & Rosenfield, note 79, at 275. 
99 Advertising durability may be more endogenous than is tangible asset durability. The 
external factor on which the useful life of advertising is thought to depend is the response 
of the advertiser's competitors. Bagwell, note 80, at 31. If the endogeneity of advertising is 
high enough, then the useful life of a particular advertisement is unknowable ex ante and 
there is no possibility of successfully administering a system with more than one asset class 
for advertising. 
100 For instance the Service assigns taxis to a class for which depreciation is allowed over 
three years, trucks weighing under 13,000 pounds to a five-year class, and trucks weighing 
13,000 pounds or more to a six-year class. Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674. 
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classes smce intangibles do not lend themselves readily to 
categorization . 
. A third problem in setting rational depreciation schedules is that 
they are constructed ex ante rather than ex post, which means they do 
not account for asset price risk. Two examples of events that might 
trigger an unexpected decline in the value of capital assets are a tech-
nological breakthrough that causes premature obsolescence and a 
shift in consumer tastes that casts yesterday's preferred products (and 
the machinery used to produce them) out of favor. lOl Unexpected 
events also can result in an increase in the value of capital assets, for 
example, the price of a building during a real estate bubble. 
Economists have argued that depreciation schedules for relatively 
risky assets should be accelerated to compensate the owners of such 
assets for bearing a disproportionately large share of the capital price 
risk.1°2 The argument in favor of accelerated depreciation for risky 
assets is a corollary of the general proposition that the government 
shares a part of a taxpayer's asset price risk by capturing through 
taxes a portion of any unexpected windfall, or mitigating the tax-
payer's bad fortune in the event of an unexpected decline in asset 
value through lower taxes (or even a refund).103 Although risk shar-
ing between taxpayers and the government generally occurs through-
out an income tax, it does not occur as fully for assets with pre-set 
depreciation schedules. The government does not share an unex-
pected decline (or rise) in the value of an asset (unless and until the 
property is scrapped or sold), since there is no mechanism for adjust-
ing depreciation schedules once assets have been placed in service.104 
The argument concludes that accelerating depreciation schedules for 
more-risky assets relative to the depreciation schedules for less-risky 
assets, would put the owners of more- and less-risky assets on par 
with one another.105 Accelerated depreciation for relatively risky as-
sets essentially is used as a surrogate for the government's usual risk-
sharing function. 
Does asset price risk affect tangible and intangible assets differ-
ently? Some have suggested that the answer to this question is yes, 
101 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 5 & n.6. 
102 Jeremy L Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. Pol. 
Econ. 20, 37-38 (1984) (concluding that depreciation schedules for relatively risky assets 
should be accelerated); Roger H. Gordon & John Douglas Wilson, Measuring the Effi-
ciency Cost of Taxing Risky Capital Income, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 427, 438 (1989) (same). 
!O3 Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 
Nat'l Tax J. 789 (1994). 
104 Bulow & Summers, note 102, at 21. 
!O5 Id. at 29-37; Michael C. Durst, The Depreciation Debate: Have Bulow and Summers 
Suggested a Viable Compromise?, 30 Tax Notes 259, 259-60 (Jan. 20, 1986). 
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since intangibles are riskier than tangible assets.l06 Although no 
econometric study has been conducted to support the proposition that 
intangibles are riskier than tangible capital, this is the widely held 
view of finance and accounting professionals and commentators.107 If 
this view is correct, then pre-set depreciation schedules' insensitivity 
to risk is more important for intangibles than for tangible assets. Con-
sequently,. the non-neutrality stemming from expensing intangibles 
costs is less than is implied by the radically different effective tax rates 
for intangibles and tangible assets.1°8 This adds credence to the argu-
ment that capitalization of intangibles is more trouble than it is worth, 
since expensing is closer to the economically correct treatment than is 
implied by an analysis that does not consider the (widely accepted yet 
unproven) incremental risk of intangibles. Theoretically, if the incre-
mental risk for intangibles is high enough, the risk-adjusted deprecia-
tion schedule for intangibles might be equivalent to expensing.109 
Short of an econometric study, however, there is no way to quantify 
how much risk matters in this context, that is, no way to judge the 
incremental risk of investing in intangible (as compared with tangible) 
assets as a class or the depreciation schedule adjustment necessary as 
a result of this increased risk. 
In addition to the three difficulties that are (or at least that may be) 
more acute for intangibles-the absence of a used asset market, the 
grouping problem, and risk-there are a number of problems encoun-
tered when designing depreciation rules that are common across all 
asset classes. For instance, economic depreciation requires that 
changes in asset values, both positive and negative, be taken into ac-
count annuallyllO and that decline in value due to aging (for example) 
must be netted against accrued but unrealized gains.111 Also, eco-
nomic depreciation requires that basis be indexed for infiation,112 
which may be desirable and even feasible but has proven politically 
106 George Mundstock, Franchises, Intangible Capital, and Assets, 43 Nat'l Tax J. 299, 
305 n.19 (1990). 
107 E.g., Baruch Lev, Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting 40-42 
(2001); Christoph Kuhner, New Financial Accounting Standards for the New Economy? 
Some Remarks on the Ongoing Debate 5-7 (undated), available at http://www.wiso.uni-
koeln.de/treuhandlforschunglSchriftenvzBeitragHagen.pdf; Wayne S. Upton, Jr., FASB 
Special Report: Business and Financial Reporting, Challenges From the New Economy 
(2001), available at http://www.fasb.orglartic1es&reports/sr_new_economy.pdf. 
108 See Figure 1 in text following note 66. 
109 See Bulow & Summers, note 102; Mundstock, note 106, at 305 n.19 (suggesting that, 
taking risk into account, expensing is necessary to maintain neutrality between tangible 
and intangible capital). 
110 Samuelson, note 32, at 605-06 (explaining that economic depreciation requires assets 
to be marked to market to reflect fluctuations in value). 
111 Id; Gann, note 4, at 112. 
112 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 49. 
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unsuccessful thus far.H3 Any workable solution to these problems is 
likely to be applied as easily to intangibles as to tangible assets. Thus, 
generic problems of this sort do not provide a sound basis on which to 
distinguish between the capitalization rules applicable to tangible and 
intangible assets. 
The two prongs of the analysis discussed thus far regarding when an 
inability to set rational depreciation schedules can justify expensing 
point in opposite directions. The high tolerance for error in setting 
the depreciation schedule for an individual asset indicates that the 
need to depart from normative capitalization rules on account of an 
inability to set depreciation schedules is quite limited. It also gives 
reason to think that capitalization should be required far more often 
than it is under current law. On the other hand, the task of setting 
acceptable system-wide depreciation schedules presents vexing is-
sues-especially for intangible assets-which cuts in the other direc-
tion, restricting the number of cases where neutrality-enhancing 
depreciation schedules likely will be attainable. Given the dearth of 
necessary empirical data to perform a refined analysis, the poli-
cymaker's job is a difficult one that requires judgment calls in close 
cases. When the policymaker's judgment is that neutrality-enhancing 
capitalization and depreciation rules are an attainable goal, one last 
factor must be considered-administrative costs. 
3. Administrative Costs 
Minimizing the costs of tax administration is as important a tax pol-
icy goal as improving neutrality. The incremental administrative bur-
den imposed by a neutrality-enhancing switch to capitalization might 
outstrip the benefits to be realized from improving neutrality. If so, 
what appears to be a beneficial change ceases to be worthwhile. 
A comprehensive account of the role of tax administration in set-
ting capitalization policy would consider a host of different costs, in-
cluding (1) involuntary compliance, costs, meaning the costs imposed 
on taxpayers by the policymaker who designs the governing rules and 
determines what data must be collected and transmitted to the gov-
ernment, (2) the costs of tax avoidance, that is, the cost of planning 
activity undertaken voluntarily to reduce tax paid, (3) the cost of liti-
gation, which is a function of the number of anticipated controversies, 
among other things, (4) the costs incurred by the Service in auditing 
taxpayers, and (5) the costs of law making, which include the costs of 
113 E.g., Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the Tax System for Inflation, in 
Uneasy Compromise: Problems of a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax 347, 359-60 (Henry 
J. Aaron, Harvey Galper & Joseph A. Pechman, eds.) (discussing reasons for the political 
failure of the 1984 Treasury recommendation on indexing basis for inflation). 
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promulgating statutes and regulations, including costs borne by the 
government and costs borne voluntarily by taxpayer-lobbyists at-
tempting to influence the law-making process.114 By their nature, ad-
ministrative costs are not susceptible to economic modeling, and 
reliable estimates of the costs of tax administration are hard to come 
by. Those estimates that exist vary widely and suggest that at a macro 
level the costs of tax administration are not quantifiable. 115 The in-
ability to quantify costs persists at the micro level-economists have 
not even attempted to quantify the costs of a given set of rules such as 
the capitalization rules. 
As with reckoning the tolerance for error in setting depreciation 
schedules and the ability to measure economic depreciation, the in-
ability to measure administrative costs does not mean that the poli-
cymaker should ignore them. First, if a modification of capitalization 
rules appears worthwhile after considering the likelihood that depreci-
ation schedules might be set within the tolerance for error and after 
considering the other difficulties in setting adequate depreciation 
rules, past experience can be used as a guide for assessing the adminis-
trative burdens that are likely to result. For example, it migbt be rea-
sonable to conclude that a particularized determination of the 
economic depreciation of a newspaper's paid subscriber base can be 
used to produce a neutrality-enhancing depreciation schedule, if costs 
(such as advertising) paid to increase the number of subscribers were 
required to be capitalized.116 Past experience shows, however, that 
relying on a case-by-case determination of asset durability to set de-
preciation schedules would result in rampant controversy.u7 Accord-
ingly, policymakers might reach an intuitive-even if not 
quantitative-determination that administrative considerations in 
some cases will undermine the conclusion that capitalization rules 
should be expanded. 
Second, if the tolerance for administrative complexity can be devel-
oped intuitively, this can be factored into the question whether neu-
trality-enhancing capitalization and depreciation rules can be 
established. Returning to the discussion of grouping heterogeneous 
114 Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency 
Cost of Funds, 43 IMF Staff Papers 172, 173 (1996). 
115 See id. 
116 See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 566-70 (1993) (find-
ing that the durability and value of a newspaper subscriber base are ascertainable). 
117 Staff of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., Fiscal Year 1994 Budget 
Reconciliation Recommendations of the Committee on Ways and Means as Submitted to 
the Committee on the Budget Pursuant to H. Con. Res. 64, at 242 (Comm. Print 1993), 
1993-3 c.B. (vol. 3) 338 (explaining the high level of controversies over depreciable lives of 
acquired intangibles like that at issue in Newark Morning Ledger led to proposal to enact 
§ 197, allowing cost recovery over an arbitrary 15-year period). 
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assets into classes for purposes of setting depreciation schedules, 
clearly the smaller the number of groups employed, the lower the ad-
ministrative costs of the system will be, since both taxpayers and the 
Service will have less data to keep track of, reporting will be simpler, 
and classification controversies will be reduced. If the policymaker 
can get an intuitive sense of the maximum number of classes that 
would be consistent with an administrable system, she can hold the 
number of asset classes constant at the tolerable limit (accepting that 
the reSUlting administrative burden will be manageable) and then pro-
ceed to the question whether neutrality-enhancing depreciation sched-
ules can be set where the number of asset classes is so constrained. 
4. Summary 
A sufficiently severe error in the applicable tax depreciation sched-
ule can render capitalization and (flawed) depreciation inferior to ex-
pensing, but the tolerance for error in setting neutrality-enhancing 
depreciation schedules is very large. Setting depreciation schedules 
that are at least minimally acceptable, however, is still a difficult task, 
particularly for intangibles. Intangibles present special problems, 
stemming from the inability to observe or accurately measure the pat-
tern of economic depreciation for such assets. When the poli-
cymaker's judgment is that minimally acceptable-that is, neutrality-
enhancing-depreciation schedules are possible, capitalization still 
might be inferior to expensing if the costs of administering a capitali-
zation and depreciation system outstrip the benefits of enhanced neu-
trality that would result from such a system. All of the aspects of the 
problem require unavailable empirical data for a refined analysis to be 
feasible; nevertheless, the foregoing discussion should give the poli-
cymaker a structure for exercising judgment based on the best availa-
ble assumptions and anecdotal evidence, even without all of the 
necessary empirical data. 
B. Multiple Taxation of Corporate Income 
Like the argument considered in the prior Subsection, the argument 
considered here focuses on intangible capital. The bulk of intangible 
capital takes the form of goodwill held by business entities.118 The 
favorable capitalization rules applicable to the cost of producing good-
will work as a subsidy in favor of business entities that hold goodwill. 
At the same time, however, the ultimate beneficial owners of a large 
percentage of business goodwill-corporate shareholders-are sub-
118 See note 125. 
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ject to the corporate double tax. The corporate double tax may cancel 
out, at least in part, the subsidy from favorable capitalization rules. 
Some have argued that remedying the non-neutrality between tangi-
ble and intangible capital would be inappropriate so long as the corpo-
rate double tax persists, since the combined effect of the two sets of 
rules is better (that is, more neutral) than a system that taxes intangi-
ble capital correctly but taxes corporate earnings twice.119 
Two forms of this argument are advanced. The first assumes that 
there are no fundamental constraints on improving the taxation of in-
come from intangible capital and that classical corporate taxation is an 
immutable trait of the system and posits that improvement of capitali-
zation and depreciation rules for intangibles is not warranted in the 
face of the classical corporate tax. 120 The second form of the argu-
ment assumes that there is a fundamental constraint on taxing returns 
to intangible capital (no set of capitalization and depreciation rules 
can be designed for intangible capital that would be administrable and 
neutrality enhancing) and justifies classical corporate taxation as a re-
sponse to the shortcomings in intangible capitalization and deprecia-
tion rules.121 The difference between the two forms of the argument is 
diametrically opposing views of the possibility of designing adequate 
(administrable and neutrality-enhancing) capitalization and deprecia-
tion rules. The common thread is the claim that current law's capitali-
zation and depreciation rules for intangibles combined with a classical 
corporate tax system are a second-best approach. 
My conclusion is that the netting effect of the corporate double tax 
and favorable treatment of intangible costs is highly imperfect, that 
the benefit to the holders of intangible capital from favorable capitali-
zation rules is probably much larger than the detriment of the corpo-
rate double tax, and consequently that the claim that the corporate tax 
justifies a departure from normative capitalization is dubious. I accept 
119 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 39 ("Accelerated depreciation, even if inconsistent 
with uniform taxation of all business assets, nonetheless may help reduce certain tax differ-
ences arising from other features of the current tax system."); id. at 46-48 ("Switching to 
economic depreciation has a small effect on overall tax neutrality because economic depre-
ciation moves the tax system away from tax neutrality at some margins of choice, while 
simultaneously promoting tax neutrality at other margins."); Brazell & Mackie, note 77, at 
542 ("Accelerated depreciation may help reduce tax distortions arising from other features 
of the current income tax system. To the extent that corporate industries are relatively 
heavy users of tax favored assets, accelerated depreciation helps reduce some of the tax 
distortions caused by the double-taxation of corporate. .. equity income. "). 
120 This is the general view of the 2000 Treasury Study, which is aimed at analyzing the 
effects of current law's depreciation regime. The study notes, however, that improvements 
to depreciation schedules could finance other policy goals, like reducing the tax burden on 
corporate income. 2000 Treasury Study, note 29, at 46. 
121 Robert Cassanos, Single Taxation of Publicly Traded Entities, 99 Tax Notes 1663, 
1672-73 (June 16, 2003). 
Imaged with th Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 578 2003-2004
578 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: 
the possibility that the classical corporate tax system mitigates the 
non-neutrality caused by rules allowing intangibles costs to be ex-
pensed, but since the neutrality cost of allowing long-lived intangibles 
costs to be expensed is likely more severe than that caused by the 
corporate tax rules, there is considerable room for improving the capi-
talization rules for intangibles without upsetting whatever balance ex-
ists between such rules and the classical corporate tax system. 
There are three problems with this line of argument. First, the tax 
expenditure analysis from the fiscal year 2005 federal budget supplies 
estimates that give insight into the degree to which the corporate divi-
dend tax and expensing of the costs of intangible capital offset each 
other. If the baseline is an entity-level tax that taxed corporate in-
come only once, the budget estimates that, for 2003, the double tax on 
corporate profits was a "negative" tax expenditure of $24 billion.122 If 
all intangible capital were held by businesses subject to the double tax 
on corporate profits and the tax expenditure for departing from nor-
mative capitalization with respect to intangible capital were in the 
neighborhood of $24 billion, then the corporate double tax and the 
capitalization exception for the cost of intangibles would offset, in the 
aggregate. 
The tax expenditure budget does not list the benefit from excep-
tions to normative capitalization for intangibles, so direct comparison 
is impossible. One can use other tax expenditure figures, however, to 
gauge, at least roughly, the magnitude of the subsidy resulting from 
capitalization exceptions for intangible capital. For instance, the 2005 
budget estimates that for fiscal year 2003, against the normal tax ex-
penditure baseline, accelerated depreciation of machinery and equip-
ment was a $49 billion tax expenditure.123 The government, therefore, 
has estimated that current law's favorable depreciation schedules and 
allowances for machinery and equipment (as compared with economic 
depreciation) were nearly two times more beneficial to taxpayers than 
the corporate double tax was detrimental.124 These figures demon-
strate that the corporate double tax does not come close to fully off-
122 Budget of the United States Government: Analytical Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2005, 
at 323-25, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudget/fy2005/pdf/spec.pdf ("This 
negative tax expenditure is measured as the shareholder level tax on dividends paid and 
capital gains realized out of earnings that have been fully taxed at the corporate level. It 
also includes the corporate tax paid on inter-corporate dividends and on corporate capital 
gains attributable to the sale of stock shares."). 
123 Id. at 288 tbl.18-I. 
124 Id. at 288 tbl.18-1, 308; see also 322 ("Beginning with the 2004 Budget, the tax ex-
penditures for accelerated depreciation under the normal [tax] law concept have been re-
calculated [and] are intended to approximate the degree of acceleration provided by 
current law over a baseline determined by real, inflation adjusted, and economic 
depreciation. "). 
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setting the advantage of accelerated 'depreciation for machinery and 
equipment. 
It is likely that the subsidy from the rules for the capitalization of 
intangibles surpasses the detriment of the corporate double tax by an 
even larger margin, for at least two reasons. First, there is probably 
far more intangible capital than tangible capital in the economy.125 
Second, taxpayers can expense most costs incurred to procure intangi-
ble capital, which is even more generous than the current accelerated 
depreciation allowed for machinery and equipment. These two fac-
tors imply that the benefit to taxpayers from expensing intangibles 
costs is greater than that arising from accelerated depreciation for ma-
chinery and equipment. 
If the corporate double tax only offsets a fraction of the tax prefer-
ence given to intangible capital, then it seems unlikely that improving 
capitalization and depreciation rules with respect to intangible capital 
would upset the balance holding the two offsetting features in equi-
poise. A more reasonable conclusion would be that the corporate 
double tax may mitigate the non-neutrality stemming from the 
favorable treatment of intangible capital to some degree, but not 
enough so that increasing the effective tax rate on intangible capital 
through modifications to the capitalization and depreciation rules is 
counterproductive. 
A second criticism of the argument is that the corporate double tax 
applies indiscriminately (1) to income derived from tangible capital 
and intangible capital subject to normative capitalization and depreci-
ation rules (such as patents) (collectively, "hard assets"), and (2) to 
intangible capital created by deductible expenses (that is, all intangi-
ble capital other than intangible capital grouped with hard assets). No 
conscious effort has been made to impose a higher tax on those tax-
payers that enjoy a greater benefit because they are in an industry 
where intangible capital is more significant. Some have argued, none-
theless, that the corporate tax rules operate in a way that imposes a 
higher burden on intangibles-intensive businesses. 
The argument is as follows. The presence of "excess" cash flows-
returns not attributable to the return to hard assets-correlates with 
the payment of dividends. The only businesses that can be expected 
to pay dividends are those with cash flows in excess of amounts 
needed to fund working capital, to acquire necessary tangible assets, 
and to fund depreciation reserves. These excess cash flows probably 
125 Cassanos, note 121, at 1673 (estimating that public companies collectively hold $7 
trillion of goodwill versus $3 trillion of tangible capital); Fullerton & Lyon, note 2, at 12 
(finding that intangible capital attributable to advertising and research comprised 11 % of 
the capital stock, and noting that this "may only account for a small part of total invest-
ment in intangible capital"). 
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are related, at least in part, to profit attributable to goodwill. In es-
sence, the costs of procuring goodwill are deducted in the year in-
curred but the transaction is held open until it can be ascertained 
whether those expenses served to create or enhance goodwill. If the 
expenses do produce goodwill, then excess profits will result and when 
distributed to shareholders, those excess profits will be subject to tax. 
The dividend tax on distributed profits that represent returns to good-
will serves to "recapture" the deduction for the cost of producing the 
goodwill that was, in hindsight, inappropriate. If, on the other hand, 
the expenses do not produce goodwill, then there will be no excess 
profits, the deduction was appropriate, and no "recapture" tax is 
necessary.126 
There are significant problems with this argument. First, while it 
may be true in most cases that firms that distribute dividends have 
excess corporate profits attributable to intangible capital, it is patently 
not true that firms always distribute cash flows in excess of the reason-
able needs of the business. There are a significant number of non-
dividend paying firms that have both vast stocks of intangible capital 
and cash hoards far in excess of the reasonable needs of the busi-
ness.127 Both tax and nontax factors induce firms to retain earnings 
that might be distributed without harming the business's ability to 
fund working capital, replace tangible assets, and fund depreciation 
reserves. Rules are in place to combat the tax-motivated retention of 
profits,128 but they have proven ineffective in inducing dividends on a 
large scale. Corporate law rules designed to mitigate the nontax fac-
tors militating in favor of retained earnings are wholly absent. Thus, 
the argument that firms with a large stock of intangible capital return 
the profits on such capital to their shareholders through dividends is 
premised on a view of corporate dividend behavior that does not de-
scribe reality. 
Second, some of the payments subject to the dividend tax grow out 
of earnings attributable to hard assets. To the extent this is the case, 
the corporate tax cannot be fairly characterized only as a mechanism 
for recapturing excessive intangibles deductions since a portion of the 
recapture will be of returns attributable to hard assets with respect to 
126 Cassanos, note 121, at 1674-75. 
127 For example, Microsoft has a book value of approximately $50 billion and a market 
capitalization of over $300 billion, implying approximately $250 billion of goodwill, yet 
prior to 2003, Microsoft paid no dividends. See Microsoft 2003 Annual Report, available 
at http://www.microsoft.comlmsft/ar.mspx. Similarly, Oracle has a book value of approxi-
mately $6 billion and a market capitalization of over $64 billion, implying approximately 
$58 billion of goodwill, yet Oracle has never paid a dividend. See Oracle 2003 Corporate 
Report, available at http://www.oracle.com/corporate/annuaLreportl2003. 
128 IRC §§ 531, 541. 
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which recapture is largely inappropriate.129 In other words, if leveling 
the playing field between hard assets and intangible capital is the goal 
of the dividend tax, it should apply only to distributions that represent 
a return to intangible capital; it applies, however, to returns to both 
hard assets and intangibles. 
A third major criticism of the argument that the corporate double 
tax is a recapture mechanism is that it does not account for intangible 
capital held by businesses not subject to the classical corporate tax 
system. Non-publicly traded businesses have a large tax incentive to 
operate in noncorporate form (or as a subchapter S corporation), to 
avoid the corporate double tax altogether. Most do so. Those that do 
not have numerous techniques available to mitigate the extent to 
which they bear the brunt of the corporate double tax,130 Thus, if one 
accepts the basic premise that the tax on dividends can operate to 
offset a prior, inappropriate deduction for a cost incurred to procure 
intangible capital, then one must conclude that double taxation should 
be more widespread than it is. 
Summary-Taxpayer-favorable capitalization rules that allow ex-
pensing are probably a bigger benefit than the corporate double tax is 
a detriment. The difference is likely substantial. On the one hand, 
since the detriment is (at least roughly) visited upon the same taxpay-
ers who enjoy the benefit of expensing for intangibles, the conclusion 
that corporate integration would be antithetical to neutrality is plausi-
ble. On the other hand, the conclusion that in the face of classical 
corporate taxation there is no benefit to be realized from improving 
capitalization and depreciation rules for intangibles is difficult to sup-
port. To the extent the corporate tax provides a detriment offsetting 
the benefit from expensing intangibles costs, it is only partial for cor-
porate taxpayers (given the relative magnitudes of the detriment and 
benefit) and is incomplete (given the presence of businesses with in-
tangible capital not subject to classical corporate taxation). 
129 Prior to the 1986 Act, this was a smaller problem that it is today. The 1986 Act 
repealed the investment tax credit and the ACRS depreciation system, both of which 
tended to reduce (and sometimes even to eliminate or make negative) the effective tax rate 
on tangible capital. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 201, 211, 100 Stat. 
2085,2121-70. If neither hard asset capital nor intangible capital bears any tax at the cor-
porate level (approximately true prior to the 1986 Act), and corporate dividends are taxed 
when distributed, the tax system treats hard assets and intangibles symmetrically-neither 
is taxed at the corporate level; both are taxed at the shareholder level. Today, however, 
hard asset capital is subject to a meaningful corporate level tax that is substantially neutral, 
but intangible capital is not. Still, one could argue that some recapture is appropriate even 
for excess returns to certain hard assets given the presence of accelerated depreciation for 
certain tangible assets like machinery and equipment. See note 123 and accompanying 
text. 
130 E.g., Boris 1. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations 
and Shareholders 'lI'lI 4.01, 8.05 (7th ed. 2000). 
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C. Steady-State Investment Patterns 
Some have argued that given a level pattern of continuing invest-
ment over time, capitalization is more trouble than it is worth since 
income is not seriously distorted.!3! Consider the following hypotheti-
cal. A starts a bicycle rental business, intending to purchase one bicy-
cle per year for as long as the business continues. Suppose that 
bicycles cost $900, last for three years, have no residual value, and 
depreciate economically in a straight line pattern ($300 per year). Ta-
ble 1 compares the allowable deductions if A is, alternatively, (1) al-
lowed to expense the cost of each bicycle or (2) required to capitalize 
the cost of each bicycle and allowed to recover it as each bicycle de-
preciates economically. 
TABLE 1 
EXPENSING VERSUS STRAIGHT LINE DEPRECIATION FOR THREE-YEAR 
PROPERTY WHERE PATTERN OF INVESTMENT Is CONSTANT AND THE 
TOTAL AMOUNT INVESTED Is CONSTANT AFTER Two YEARS 
Expensing 
Total 
Year 1 
$900 
900 
Capitalization and Depreciation 
Purchased Year 1 300 
Purchased Year 2 
Purchased Year 3 
Purchased Year 4 
Purchased Year 5 
Total $300 
Year 2 
$900 
900 
300 
300 
$600 
Year 3 
$900 
900 
300 
300 
300 
$900 
Year 4 
$900 
900 
300 
300 
300 
$900 
Year 5 
$900 
900 
300 
300 
300 
$900 
Once the expansion phase of A's business ends, that is, once invest-
ment peaks at three bicycles in Year 3, the aggregate depreciation 
from the bicycles in A's stock exactly equals the cost of each new bicy-
cle purchased. Thus, after the second year, A enjoys a $900 deduction 
per year regardless of whether A expenses or capitalizes the cost of 
each new bicycle. For the first two years, however, A has lower taxa-
ble income under expensing than capitalization (due to greater deduc-
tions). When the continuing investment ends, the tax advantage of 
expensing reverses.132 
13\ E.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 
1982) ("Under [steady-state] conditions the benefits of capitalization are unlikely to exceed 
the accounting and other administrative costs entailed in capitalization."); William Popkin, 
Introduction to Federal Income Taxation 387 (1987) (arguing that given a steady-state pat-
tern, "it will not always be worth the effort to capitalize every outlay with a savings fea-
ture"); Lee, note 1, at 336-42. 
132 Several factors could precipitate the end of the continuing investment. In the exam-
ples that follow I assume it is because the business is being wound up; however, it is likely 
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Suppose that when A winds up her business at some future date she 
is able to sell the bicycles on hand for their fair market value. If A 
winds up her business on the last day of Year 1, she will have one 
bicycle on hand with a fair market value of $600.133 If capitalization is 
required, A's basis will also equal $600 (given the assumption that the 
straight line depreciation allowed for tax purposes is economic), re-
sulting in no gain or loss on sale. On the other hand, if expensing is 
permitted, her basis will be zero and A will incur gain of $600 on the 
date the bicycle is sold. Either way A ends up in exactly the same 
place, because (1) if A is allowed to expense, the net effect of the 
expensing deduction ($900) and the gain on sale ($600) exactly equals 
the result to A if capitalization is required-a depreciation deduction 
of $300 and no gain or loss on sale, and (2) there is no timing advan-
tage since all of the items would be reported on the same return in 
either case. 
If A winds up her business later, however, the results under expens-
ing and capitalization diverge because of the time value of money. If 
A winds up her business at the end of Year 2 or any subsequent year, 
she will have bicycles on hand worth $900, as follows: 
TABLE 2 
(1) 
Cost 
Purchased at beginning of year 
Purchased at beginning of prior year 
Purchased two years prior (or earlier)134 
$900 
$900 
$900 
(2) 
Cumulative 
Depreciation 
$300 
$600 
$900 
(3) 
FMV 
«1) less (2)) 
$600 
$300 
$0 
$900 
Where capitalization is required, the amount realized on sale at the 
end of Year 2 or any subsequent year ($900) will equal A's basis, so no 
gain or loss will be realized. Where expensing is permitted, on the 
other hand, the gain on the sale of the bicycles on hand135 will reverse 
that continuing investments stop for other reasons (such as products falling out of favor). I 
discuss below the extent to which this affects the analysis. See notes 135 and 139. 
133 The cost of the bicycle purchased at the beginning of Year 1 ($900) less depreciation 
allowed during Year 1 ($300) equals $600. 
134 This row is only relevant in Year 3 and later years. 
135 A's gain is the excess of the $900 amount realized over her zero basis. On different 
facts, the analysis in later years when the business winds down might change, but the bot-
tom line result likely would be similar if not identical. For example, if the capital asset is an 
intangible (say business goodwill) that cannot be sold apart from the business, then assum-
ing the cost of procuring the goodwill had been capitalized, it would be deductible on 
dissolution of the enterprise. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992) 
("[W]here no specific asset or useful life can be ascertained, [capitalized costs are] de-
ducted upon dissolution of the enterprise.") The write-off of the goodwill might be more 
or less valuable to the taxpayer than an offset to the amount realized on the sale of the 
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the benefit reaped by A in Years 1 and 2 from expensing as opposed 
to capitalization ($900136). Thus, ignoring the time value of money, 
both the government and the taxpayer should be indifferent between 
expensing and capitalization. 
Considering the time value of money, however, the taxpayer always 
fares better under expensing than under capitalization.137 The extent 
to which expensing is taxpayer-favorable depends on three factors: (1) 
the discount rate, (2) the number of years over which the property is 
depreciable, and (3) the number of years of continuing investment. 
The first two factors are extremely significant; the third factor is rela-
tively insignificant. 
The significance of the discount rate is intuitively obvious. An ex-
pensing taxpayer gains a timing benefit from accelerated deductions 
and deferral of gain on the sale of the bicycles on hand when the busi-
ness winds up. The higher the applicable discount rate, the greater 
these benefits, all else being equal. 
The depreciable life ,of the property is also extremely significant. 
This factor influences the analysis in two ways. First, the longer the 
depreciation schedule following capitalization, the greater the relative 
benefit to the taxpayer allowed to expense. For instance, expensing 
dominates depreciation over 10 years by a wider margin than it domi-
nates depreciation over three years. Second, the gain on the sale of 
the assets on hand when the business winds up will be smaller-both 
in absolute and present value terms-if the business winds up before 
the level of continuing investment hits its peak. For example, if A's 
business winds up after the first year, the gain on the sale of the bicy-
cle on hand would be $600 ($900 cost less $300 depreciation). As 
demonstrated above, if the business ends after Year 2 or any subse-
quent year, the gain will be $900.138 Thus, this second point is only 
relevant when the business winds up during the initial expansion 
phase. 
The third factor, the number of periods of continuing investment, is 
relatively insignificant compared with the discount rate and the length 
bicycle in the example in the text, depending on a variety of factors, but in both cases the 
basis would be recoverable when the asset is sold or the business is dissolved, as the case 
may be. It is also possible that the continuing investment will stop but the business will 
continue. See note 139. 
136 The benefit of expensing over capitalization was $600 in Year 1 (the excess of the 
expensing deduction of $900 over the depreciation deduction of $300). The benefit in Year 
2 was $300 (the excess of the expensing deduction of $900 over the depreciation deduction 
of $600). Hence the total benefit in Years 1 and 2 is $900. 
137 This assumes the business is carried on for more than one year. See note 133 and 
accompanying text (demonstrating that if an asset is sold in the year acquired, expensing 
and capitalization yield the same reSUlt). 
138 See text accompanying note 134. 
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of the depreciation schedule. The duration of the continuing invest-
ment influences two factors, the net effect of which usually will be 
quite small. For an expensing taxpayer, the longer the period of con-
tinuing investment, the greater the deferral of the gain realized on the 
sale of the assets when the business ends,139 The absolute amount of 
the gain neither rises nor falls after the level of investment peaks, but 
the present value of the gain shrinks as it becomes more distant. 
As the benefit of deferring this gain grows, the benefit reaped dur-
ing the expansion phase of the business (additional deductions during 
Years 1 and 2 in this example) shrinks in proportion to the overall 
stream of investments. Expensing of investments during the start-up 
phase provides a benefit the absolute size of which is constant; how-
ever, the relative magnitude of the expensing benefit as a portion of 
the overall stream of investments diminishes the longer the steady-
state investment continues. Consider the following. If the business in 
the prior example continues for six years, the pattern of depreciation 
deductions under expensing and capitalization are as follows: 
TABLE 3 
Year Expensing Capitalization 
1 $900 $300 
2 900 600 
3 900 900 
4 900 900 
5 900 900 
6 900 900 
139 Consistent with the facts of the example, I assume that the period of continuing in-
vestment lasts until the business ends, and that winding up involves selling all assets on 
hand for their fair market values. 
Suppose instead that the taxpayer just suspends investment, but does not sell the assets 
on hand. In the years following the year investment is suspended, a capitalizing taxpayer 
will be entitled to depreciation deductions for any remaining basis; an expensing taxpayer, 
by contrast, will get no such deductions. The relative fortunes of a capitalizing and an 
expensing taxpayer would be approximately the same under these new facts. The benefit 
to the capitalizing taxpayer who suspends her investment (depreciation deductions equal 
to the basis left on the date investment is suspended) would not have been realized if the 
property had been sold. This benefit does not improve the capitalizing taxpayer's position 
vis-a-vis the expensing taxpayer because the detriment the expensing taxpayer would have 
suffered had she sold assets (gain on sale) is avoided if the property is retained. Thus, both 
are better off by the same amount. (Considering the time value of money, the tax detri-
ment the expensing taxpayer avoided by not selling the assets on hand (gain on sale) would 
have been slightly worse than the tax benefit enjoyed by the capitalizing taxpayer (a deduc-
tion of any remaining basis), since the gain for the expensing taxpayer would have oc-
curred all at once, whereas the depreciation deductions would be allowed over a number of 
years.) 
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If, on the other hand, the business in the prior example continues for 
only three years, the pattern of depreciation deductions is: 
TABLE 4 
Year Expensing Capitalization 
1 $900 $300 
2 900 600 
3 900 900 
The sum of the present values of the deductions for the three-and six-
year businesses, assuming a 10% discount rate, are: 
TABLE 5 
(1) (2) (3) 
PVof PVof (2) as a 
Expensing Capitalization % of 
Deductions Deductions (1) 
Three-Year Business $2,238 $1,445 65% 
Six-Year Business $3,920 $3,126 80% 
As demonstrated by this example, the "extra" depreciation deductions 
taken by an expensing taxpayer during the expansion phase of the 
business affords her an advantage with a greater relative significance 
the earlier the continuing investment stops. But if the business winds 
up sooner (so the continuing investment stops sooner), the present 
value of the gain on the sale of the assets on hand at that time will be 
larger, mitigating this benefit in part. 
Figure 2 depicts the results if the bicycle business continues for be-
tween one and twenty years, assuming a 10% discount rate. Figure 2 
demonstrates two things: (1) The benefit of expensing increases with 
the length of the period of continuing investment because the benefit 
of deferring the gain when the business winds up is always more sig-
nificant than the decrease in the relative benefit of expensing during 
the expansion phase (so from the expensing taxpayer's point of view, 
the longer the period of continuing investment, the better); and (2) 
The incremental benefit of expensing (as opposed to capitalization 
and depreciation) increases in absolute terms as the period of continu-
ing investment is extended.140 
140 As described below, the relative benefit of expensing over depreciation is extremely 
(though not completely) insensitive to the duration of continuing investment. See text 
following note 141. 
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The significance of the four curves in Figure 2 is as follows: 
(1) PV of gain on sale This curve shows the present value of the 
gain that will result when the business owner allowed to expense her 
investment disposes of those assets on hand at the end of the period of 
continuing investment. The gain is negative because it generates a tax 
liability. The magnitude of the present value of the gain decreases as 
the period of continuing investment grows because the gain is pushed 
further into the future. 
(2) PV benefit of expensing This curve shows the present value of 
the aggregate deductions for expensing. This curve rises as the dura-
tion of the continuing investment lengthens because the longer the 
duration of investment, the greater the aggregate investment and cor-
responding expensing deductions. Because the present value of the 
incremental deductions for each successive future periods is less than 
for the prior period, the rate of growth decelerates; this is why the 
slope of the curve flattens as the duration of continuing investment 
lengthens. 
(3) PV of expensing (net of gain on sale) This curve shows the pre-
sent value of the expensing deductions net of the present value of the 
gain on sale. It combines the first two curves. 
(4) PV of depreciation deductions This curve shows the present 
value of the deductions allowed a taxpayer who is required to capital-
ize and depreciate the costs of the capital investments. The depreciat-
ing taxpayer will incur neither gain nor loss on sale so this curve shows 
net benefit of depreciation deductions. 
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The spread between curves (3) and (4) represents the difference be-
tween the present value of the depreciation and expensing deductions. 
The present value of the deductions allowed an expensing taxpayer 
net of the gain on sale (curve (3)) is always greater than the present 
value of the deductions allowed a taxpayer required to capitalize her 
investment (curve (4)).141 Although the absolute size of the incremen-
tal benefit to the expensing taxpayer grows as the period of continuing 
investment grows (observe that curve (3) rises more rapidly than 
curve (4)), the relative benefit changes only slightly. 
The relative benefit afforded the expensing taxpayer, depicted in 
Figure 3, can be expressed as the percentage by which the present 
value of the expensing deductions surpasses the present value of de-
preciation deductions for a given period of continuing investment. 
FIGURE 3 
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Figure 3 demonstrates that after an initial phase, the relative benefit 
of expensing levels off; no matter how long the continuing investment 
persists, the proportional benefit to the expensing taxpayer remains 
almost constant. 
The relative benefit of expensing, measured in percentage terms, 
rather than the absolute dollar amount of the benefit, is the appropri-
ate metric to consider when assessing the argument under considera-
tion. This is because the administrative costs of requiring 
141 As noted, the two are equal during the first year. See text accompanying note 133. 
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capitalization and depreciation should be weighed against the costs of 
the nonneutrality stemming from a rule that permits expensing. The 
principal cost of a nonneutral rule is its impact on taxpayer behavior 
and the resulting deadweight loss. For instance, the possibility of 
deferral is not likely to influence the behavior of a taxpayer making a 
$1 million investment because the benefit from expensing, the present 
value of which is $100, is only .01 % of the amount invested, whereas 
deferral worth $100 is likely to influence greatly a taxpayer making a 
$1,000 investment, for whom the benefit is 10% of the amount in-
vested. When assessing the probable costs of a rule that allows ex-
pensing of investments that fall into a steady-state pattern, therefore, 
the relative benefit of expensing is more telling than the absolute dol-
lar value of that benefit. 
The example depicted in Figures 2 and 3 was based on three-year 
property and a 10% discount rate. Table 6 shows how the relative 
difference between expensing and capitalization plays out for assets 
with a range of depreciable lives, at three separate discount rates. 
TABLE 6 
INCREMENTAL NET TAX BENEFIT FROM EXPENSING DEDUCTIONS OVER 
DEPRECIATION DEDUCTIONS 142 
10% 6% 3% 
Two-Year Property 4.7% 2.8% 1.4% 
Three-Year Property 9.5% 5.8% 2.9% 
Seven-Year Property 31.1% 18.6% 9.3% 
Ten-Year Property 49.3% 29.3% 14.6% 
Commentators often explain the sensitivity of the tax benefit of ex-
pensing to the durability of the asset and to the discount rate by anal-
ogy to an interest-free loan by the government to the expensing 
taxpayer.143 Suppose capitalization and depreciation are required 
(that is, expensing is prohibited) and the government takes the incre-
142 Each percentage in Table 6 is (1) the excess of (a) the present value of expensing 
deductions (net of gain on sale) over (b) the present value of depreciation deductions, 
divided by (2) the present value of depreciation deductions. These are approximations, 
since determining the incremental benefit from expensing requires a precise assumption 
regarding the number of periods the investment in question continues. Each percentage 
listed in Table 6 is the average benefit derived from expensing under eight alternatives: 
The business continued for 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 60, and 90 years. The results for the 
alternatives are tightly clustered. The largest standard deviation-1.6 percentage points-
is for lO-year property at a 10% discount rate. The smallest-less than one-twentieth of a 
percentage point-is for three-year property at a 3% discount rate. 
143 Musgrave & Musgrave, note 5, at 382-83; Stanley S. Surrey, The Tax Reform Act of 
1969-Tax Deferral and Tax Shelters, 12 B.C. Indus. &. Comm. L. Rev. 307, 310-11 (1971). 
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mental tax proceeds collected as a consequence of normative depreci-
ation deductions (as compared with the proceeds that would have 
been collected if expensing were permitted) and loans those proceeds 
interest free to the owners of depreciating assets. Suppose, in addi-
tion, that each taxpayer must repay the loan over time as depreciation 
is allowed. The lender's (government's) forgone interest with respect 
to a given taxpayer is equal to the net tax benefit that taxpayer would 
have enjoyed from expensing. The taxpayer winds up better off (1) 
the longer the loan is outstanding, and (2) the higher the avoided in-
terest charge. As the durability of the asset in question grows, the 
loan is outstanding for a longer period (that is, the period of deferral 
is longer); as the interest rate grows, the avoided interest on the loan 
is greater (that is, deferral is more valuable). 
The premise of the argument under consideration is that given an 
even pattern of continuing investment over time, income is not seri-
ously distorted.144 The conclusion drawn from this premise is that 
given a pattern of continuing investment, capitalization is more 
trouble than it is worth. Table 6 shows that for certain combinations 
of discount rates and depreciable lives, the present value of the bene-
fit of expensing rather than capitalization is slight (in percentage 
terms) and therefore it is likely that the costs of capitalization are not 
worth incurring. For long-lived property, however, the present value 
of the benefit of expensing is relatively large, particularly if interest 
rates are high, and therefore the neutrality enhancement that flows 
from capitalization is likely to exceed the resulting administrative 
costs. The argument, therefore, is too broad and needs to be refined 
to be plausible. 
A refined version of the argument would be that given a pattern of 
continuing investment, expensing is appropriate when (1) the adminis-
trative costs of capitalization exceed (2) the benefit of capitalization 
(that is, neutrality improvement), which benefit is likely to be slight 
given certain combinations of low discount rates and short deprecia-
tion schedules. Two inputs necessary to refine the argument are avail-
able. Discount rates used by businesses vary widely, but in many 
instances Congress and the Service have made assumptions regarding 
the appropriate discount or interest rate, and this has proven worka-
ble in practice.145 The second input, the depreciation schedule, is for 
most tangible assets at least, set by law or regulation and thus freely 
available.146 Two additional inputs make it difficult to evaluate where 
this argument is persuasive. First, as discussed above, no refined esti-
144 See note 131. 
145 See IRC §§ 382(f), 1274(d). 
146 IRC § 168; Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674. 
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mate of the administrative costs that follow from capitalization is pos-
sible. Even a crude approximation that takes into account all of the 
relevant aspects of administrative burden is difficult to determine.147 
Second, gauging the benefit of capitalization (that is, the benefit of 
neutrality improvement) is not an easy task. The extent of the ineffi-
ciency caused by expensing depends on how taxpayers respond to ex-
pensing, which is difficult to predict. Arguably, also, an inequity 
would arise from excepting certain taxpayers from capitalization but 
not others, even though they are purchasing identical assets, simply 
because one makes regular investments and the other does not. 
Translating any inequity into a dollar figure to be weighed against the 
administrative burdens cannot be done formulaically; quantifying the 
cost of inequity ultimately depends on subjective value judgments. 
In the absence of empirical data that would allow the policymaker 
to weigh the administrative burden of capitalization and the cost of 
permitting expensing, one could fairly ask whether the foregoing anal-
ysis has any practical significance. I believe that it does. I have identi-
fied cases where the argument under consideration is unlikely to be 
convincing given the magnitude of the income measurement error. 
For example, an argument that an exception to capitalization is appro-
priate given a steady state of continuing investment in property with a 
useful life of 10 years or longer should be rejected (absent huge ad-
ministrative burdens) since even at very low discount rates, the result-
ing nonneutrality is substantial, implying significant excess burden. 
Second, the inability to measure administrative costs does not mean 
that the policymaker should ignore them. Cases where the adminis-
trative burden is known to be high (even if unquantifiable) and the 
depreciable life of the property at issue is short might present a case 
where my refined version of the argument should lead to an excep-
tion. In the next Subsection, I consider such a case.148 
The point of this analysis is not to forecast the level of investment 
by an expensing taxpayer, but to forecast the difference in the tax in-
centive to invest for taxpayers depending on whether they must capi-
talize and deduct their outlays or may expense them. In cases where 
expensing creates a significant incentive for expensing taxpayers vis-a-
vis depreciating taxpayers, the resulting inefficiency is likely to be sub-
stantial as taxpayers reallocate their investments to take advantage of 
the tax incentive. It is an heuristically useful technique when assessing 
the magnitude of the incentive and the level of inequity to set equal 
147 See note 114 and accompanying text (identifying the components of the administra-
tive costs of formulating, complying with, and enforcing tax rules). 
148 See text following note 168, discussing the 12-month rule of the proposed INDOPCO 
regulations. 
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the pattern of investment and observe how different variables-here 
changes in the discount rate, depreciable life of the property, and the 
period of reinvestment-alter the present value of the allowable cost 
recovery deductions assuming alternatively expensing or depreciation. 
Setting equal the pattern of investment is not based on an assump-
tion-as some have suggested-that taxpayers are indifferent to the 
relative benefit of expensing versus capitalization and depreciation;149 
rather using an equal pattern of investment helps to gauge the magni-
tude of the preference and gain insight into the likely impact of creat-
ing an exception to capitalization.I50 
Summary-I have shown that where investment occurs in an even 
pattern over a number of years, the present value of expensing and 
depreciation deductions are not as different as they are when assess-
ing a solitary investment. The extent of the difference between the 
present value of expensing and depreciation deductions depends criti-
cally on (1) the durability of the property in question (which controls 
the length of the depreciation schedule) and (2) the discount rate, and 
less significantly on (3) the number of years of continuing investment. 
Cases where expensing does not provide a substantial relative advan-
tage over capitalization in present value terms, as is the case for short-
lived investments in a low-interest-rate environment, may justify an 
exception from normative capitalization if the administrative costs of 
capitalization surpass the costs of the nonneutrality and inequity from 
allowing certain taxpayers with steady-state investment patterns to ex-
pense their investments. 
D. Short-Lived Assets 
Some commentators have argued that the prices of short-lived as-
sets are less sensitive to defects in depreciation schedules than are the 
prices of long-lived assets, and therefore errors made in setting depre-
ciation schedules for short-lived assets matter less.151 It follows that 
creating an exception to capitalization for short-lived assets will not 
149 See Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1019,1074-75 (1989) (arguing that the steady-state argument is based on an unrealis-
tic assumption that an expensing taxpayer and a depreciating taxpayer would make the 
same investment). 
150 Cf. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is 
Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 Tax L. Rev. 1, 10 (1996) (making a contrary assump-
tion in a related context, and explaining that although portfolio adjustments in the pres-
ence of risk might not occur, it is useful to assume that they will for purposes of illustrating 
the result that follows). 
151 E.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Whither Tax Depreciation, 54 Nat'l Tax J. 513, 524 (2001) 
(arguing that assets that "depreciate very rapidly ... are likely to be less sensitive to slower 
write-offs because the rate of return is less important to the economic cost of using these 
assets"). 
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result in costly non-neutralities.152 Given certain assumptions, this is 
true. Suppose there are two assets, a one-year asset and an asset with 
an infinite useful life ("perpetual asset"), both cost $100, and both will 
generate a 10% annual return net of depreciation. This means the 
one-year asset returns to the owner her cost ($100) plus a $10 profit. 
The perpetual asset lasts forever so no cost recovery is allowed (the 
$100 investment is maintained in the value of the asset);153 at the end 
of each year the owner gets only the $10 profit.154 Suppose also that 
the tax rate is 35 %. The facts of the example thus far are: 
TABLE 7 
One-Year 
Asset 
Perpetual 
Asset 
Cost $100 $100 
Capital recovery 100 
Return 10 10 
Tax(35% Effective rate)155 3.50 3.50 
After-tax return 6.50 6.50 
Yield 6.5% 6.5% 
Now suppose instead that the owner of each of the assets is allowed 
to expense the cost of the assets. Expensing is equivalent to exempt-
ing the yield from tax.156 Thus, the facts change as follows: 
TABLE 8 
One-Year Perpetual 
Asset Asset 
Cost $100 $100 
Capital recovery 100 
Return 10 10 
Tax (zero effective rate) 
After-tax return 10 10 
Yield 10% 10% 
152 Regulations governing capitalization of costs to procure intangible assets, rights, and 
benefits contain just such an exception. See Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(1) (excepting from capi-
talization costs that procure benefits that expire within 12 months). Courts also have con-
cluded that allowing expensing for short-lived assets is appropriate, citing high 
administrative costs. E.g., U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137, 1147 
(7th Cir. 2001). 
153 This assumes static interest rates. 
154 Many assets could fit these descriptions. The one-year asset could be a financial 
asset like a bond, a piece of machinery or equipment with a short useful life, or a license or 
permit to do business for a short period of time. The perpetual asset could be a financial 
asset (a perpetuity) or a piece of land. The significant point is the pattern of cash flows 
from the assets, not their identity. 
155 The 35% nominal tax rate translates into a 35% effective tax rate because 
depreciation is economic (recovery after one year for the one-year asset; no recovery for 
the perpetual asset). See Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 9. 
156 See note 23 and accompanying text. 
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Investors quickly will bid up the price of both the one-year asset 
and the perpetual asset, given the tax-preferred status of these invest-
ments, assuming the market is efficient. If the prevailing return on 
capital generally available is 6.5% after tax, the price will increase un-
til the yield on both assets drops from 10% to 6.5%. After prices 
adjust, the facts will be: 
Cost 
Capital recovery 
Return 
Tax (zero effective rate) 
TABLE 9 
One-Year 
Asset 
$103.29 
100.00 
10.00 
Perpetual 
Asset 
$153.84 
10.00 
After-tax return 10.00 10.00 
Yield 6.5% 6.5% 
The present value of $110 (the after-tax cash flow on the one-year 
asset, which includes the return on invested capital and capital recov-
ery) discounted for one year at 6.5% equals $103.29. The present 
value of the perpetual asset, $153.84, equals the after-tax return ($10) 
divided by the prevailing yield (6.5 %). In an efficient market these 
are the prices at which the one-year asset and the perpetual asset will 
settle. Moving from economic depreciation to expensing causes the 
perpetual asset's price to spike by 54%, and the one-year asset's price 
to increase by a mere 3.3%. 
It is the widely different price sensitivity of short- and long-lived 
assets to errors in depreciation schedules that leads to the conclusion 
that expensing matters less for short-lived assets than for long-lived 
assets.157 If expensing has a smaller effect on the price of short-lived 
assets, the resulting efficiency costs will be smaller (less loss of neu-
trality, smaller excess burden).158 
The foregoing analysis, however, includes an assumption that ren-
ders the two investments incomparable. The implicit assumption 
when comparing a one-year asset and a perpetual asset is that the 
owner of the one-year asset will consume the entire return, part of 
which represents a return of capital, whereas the owner of the long-
lived asset will consume only the after-tax yield.159 A proper compari-
son would evaluate the relative price sensitivity of one long-lived asset 
and a series of short-lived assets that, if purchased seriatim, would 
157 See Gravelle, note 151, at 524. 
158 See id. 
159 Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 12 (explaining that when short- and long-lived 
assets are compared for just one period, it "do[es] not allow comparison of equivalent 
consumption flows over time"). 
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have the same lifespan as the long-lived asset.160 The reason this is 
true lies in what economists call the intertemporal nature of capital. 
Alan Auerbach explained the concept concisely as follows: 
If the firm invests in a very short-lived asset, which yields 
flows over a brief period of time, the stockholders are pre-
sumed to consume the same fraction of this return as they 
would of a much smaller flow coming over a longer period 
from a more durable asset of equal value. It seems ... rea-
sonable to assume that the rate of saving [will] be inversely 
related to the durability of the asset .... 161 
In other words, investors' decisions regarding whether to consume or 
reinvest are likely independent of the durability of the assets they 
hold. Given that the opportunity to reinvest recovered capital is un-
fettered, this is a much more realistic assumption than the contrary 
assumption that consumption patterns match asset durability. 
Basing the comparison on an assumption that is consistent with the 
intertemporal nature of capital, the prices of long- and short-lived 
assets move in tandem as depreciation errors (including expensing) 
are introduced. For example, compare the perpetual asset from the 
prior example with an infinite number of one-year assets, purchased 
seriatim. A taxpayer seeking to secure a fixed annual return for the 
foreseeable future at the market yield (6.5%) could purchase the one-
year asset for $103.29. In one year's time, she would receive $110, a 
$6.714 profit. This profit is tax-exempt given the assumption that ex-
pensing is permitted. She then could reinvest the $103.29 difference 
($110 less $6.714) and the next year she would receive another $110. 
And so on. Alternatively, she could purchase a perpetual asset that 
would return the same after-tax yield. Such a perpetual asset would 
cost $103.29.162 This is the perpetual asset that is comparable to the 
series of one-year assets. 
If instead a taxpayer wanted to secure a $10 return after taxes, 
rather than $6.71, she could buy, alternatively, a perpetual asset for 
$153.85 ($10 + 6.5%) or a one-year asset for $153.85, which in one 
year's time would return her $163.85 (a 6.5% profit), leaving her with 
$10 to consume and $153.85 to reinvest, and so on. 
The important point is that if the after-tax return for two assets with 
different useful lives is an equal sum of money (net of capital recov-
160 Id. at 9-10, 12 (explaining that the key when comparing assets with different useful 
lives is to "compar[e equal] consumption patterns over equivalent time periods"). 
161 Alan J. Auerbach, Tax Neutrality and the Social Discount Rate: A Suggested Frame-
work, 17 J. Pub. Econ. 355, 359 (1982). 
162 $6.714 ... 6.5%. 
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ery, which is assumed to be reinvested), the price of one long-lived 
asset is always the same as the price of a series of short-lived assets 
that collectively have a comparable duration. After-tax yields on the 
two investments are necessarily equal as well. Consequently, the sen-
sitivity of after-tax yields to flaws in depreciation is the factor that 
controls the relative price sensitivity of short- and long-lived assets, 
not the sensitivity of prices of individual assets to changes in invest-
ment yields. 
Differences between economic depreciation and tax depreciation 
skew effective tax rates. Depreciating an asset for tax purposes at a 
pace faster than economic depreciation results in an effective tax rate 
below the nominal rate.163 Conversely, depreciating an asset for tax 
purposes at a pace slower than economic depreciation results in an 
effective tax rate higher than the nominal rate.164 Because the effec-
tive tax rate measures the impact of flaws in tax depreciation sched-
ules on after-tax yields, it is the appropriate metric to judge the 
relative impact on neutrality of allowing assets of varying durability to 
be expensed.165 
As Weisbach has demonstrated, a given percentage error in measur-
ing the useful life of an asset translates into a change in the effective 
tax rate that is equal for all assets, regardless of their durability. Set-
ting the depreciation schedule for a 10-year asset at eight years rather 
than 10 years (a 20% error) reduces the effective tax rate roughly 
11 % .166 Weisbach shows that to understate the effective tax rate of a 
five-year asset by the same amount (11 %), depreciation would have to 
be allowed over four years (again, a 20% error); for a one-year asset, 
depreciation would have to be allowed over 9.6 months, and so on.167 
It follows that mismeasuring depreciation for short-lived assets will 
have the same impact on effective tax rates (and hence neutrality) as a 
comparable (that is, equal percentage) measurement error for long-
lived assets. The argument that short-lived assets are less sensitive 
than long-lived assets to uneconomic depreciation schedules or ex-
pensing is therefore unpersuasive. 
A second argument for expensing the costs of short-lived assets is 
that such costs likely will be incurred regularly, given that the asset or 
benefit procured thereby will wear out quickly. This increases the 
likelihood that the costs will fall into a steady-state investment pat-
163 Musgrave & Musgrave, note 5, at 382-83. 
164 Id. 
165 See Weisbach, Measurement, note 5, at 13 ("Because we care about deviations of 
effective tax rates from neutrality, we should try to create roughly equal percentage mea-
surement errors regardless of durability .... "). 
166 See id. at 12-14. 
167 See id. 
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tern. As demonstrated above, for short-lived assets purchased in a 
steady-state pattern, the income-measurement error occasioned by ex-
pensing is likely to be slight.168 
Take the case of a trucking company that purchases licenses and 
insurance policies, none of which has a lifespan of over 12 months. 
Because licenses and policies must be purchased throughout the year 
as old licenses and policies expire, a substantial portion of the benefits 
of licenses and policies purchased one year will be enjoyed during the 
following year.169 So long as the pattern of investment remains level, 
the income measurement error is likely to be small. If this small mea-
surement error imposes a lower cost on the tax system than the ad-
ministrative burden of requiring the costs to be capitalized, then an 
exception to capitalization is justified. Designing a rule to implement 
such an exception might be difficult, however, given that it should be 
restricted to taxpayers with a level pattern of investment, a trait ob-
served only retrospectively. If the business is expanding (so the level 
of the insurance premiums and the number of licenses is continually 
increasing from year to year), then the approximate equivalency be-
tween capitalization and expensing does not hold po 
There is an apparent tension between my conclusions that (1) equal 
percentage measurement errors in depreciation schedules matter as 
much for short-lived assets as long-lived assets, and (2) expensing cap-
ital costs will not seriously distort income assuming a steady-state in-
vestment pattern in short-lived assets.171 The first conclusion implies 
that expensing short-lived assets will introduce substantial non-neu-
tralities and the second conclusion implies the opposite. The differ-
ence lies in the subject analyzed in reaching the two conclusions. The 
first conclusion arose from an analysis focusing on the taxation of indi-
vidual assets. The second conclusion, in contrast, arose from an analy-
sis focusing on the net effect of the expensing allowance on taxpayers 
with particular patterns of investment. Since the federal income tax is 
imposed on taxpayers, not on assets, this latter mode of analysis, at 
least in theory, can identify instances where expensing assets acquired 
in a steady-state pattern is not seriously distortive. 
Others have pointed out that rules allowing taxpayers to expense 
short-lived assets are a risky proposition for the policymaker, since 
taxpayers can replicate the benefits of deferral without limit by manu-
168 See Subsection III.C. 
169 These are the essential facts of U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 
1137, 1147 (7th Cir. 2001). 
170 Musgrave & Musgrave, note 5, at 385 (noting that if expensing is permitted for a 
taxpayer with a continually rising stock of assets, tax theoretically could be postponed 
forever). 
171 Compare text accompanying notes 166-67 with Section III.C. 
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facturing circular cash-flows between taxpayers and financial in-
termediaries. l72 Apparently the drafters of the INDOPCO 
regulations were concerned about this possibility. The exception for 
short-term assets (the "12-month rule")173 itself contains an exception. 
The 12-month rule does not apply to financial interests, including 
loans, insurance, derivatives, stocks, and the likeP4 Any tax shelter 
designed to exploit the 12-month rule therefore must involve nonfi-
nancial capital. This means that non tax factors at some point will limit 
the maximum size of the shelter. Application of the 12-month rule to 
financial assets would allow a transaction similar to the one in Knetsch 
v. United States,115where the only limit on the size of the transaction is 
the taxpayer's appetite for tax avoidanceP6 Despite the exclusion of 
financial assets from the 12-month rule, some fear that the 12-month 
rule will result in substantial taxpayer abuse.177 
Summary-The argument that expensing the costs of short-lived as-
sets will not result in significant efficiency costs because the prices of 
short-lived assets are relatively insensitive to errors in depreciation 
schedules is flawed. The analysis underlying this argument unrealisti-
cally assumes that investors in short-lived assets have different con-
sumption patterns than investors in long-lived assets. Substituting a 
more realistic assumption-that consumption and reinvestment are 
independent of asset durability-reveals that the prices of short- and 
long-lived assets respond similarly to equal changes in investment 
yield. Because equal percentage measurement errors in setting depre-
ciation schedules for short- and long-lived assets produce comparable 
deviations in after-tax investment yield, it follows that mismeasuring 
depreciation for short-lived assets will be as costly as for long-lived 
assets. When, however, a taxpayer purchases short-lived assets in a 
steady-state investment pattern, expensing may be justifiable, at least 
172 Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The Proposed INDOPCO Capitalization 
Regulations, 99 Tax Notes 1381, 1383-84 (June 2, 2003). 
173 The 12-month rule does not require capitalization of costs related to certain intangi-
ble assets with a life that does not extend beyond the earlier of (1) 12 months after the first 
date on which the taxpayer realizes a right or benefit and (2) the end of the taxable year 
following the taxable year during which payment is made. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(1). 
174 Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(3). 
175 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
176 See Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in 
Compaq v. Commissioner, 94 Tax Notes 511, 512 (Jan. 28, 2002) (explaining that, in 
Knetsch, "[t]he circularity of the transaction ensured that it would not subject [the tax-
payer] to any downside economic risk, or alter market interest rates even if thousands of 
taxpayers did the same deal"). 
177 Johnson, note 172, at 1383 (predicting a wave of "multi-billion dollar" tax shelters 
manipulating the 12-month rule). 
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where the administrative costs of capitalization outstrip the efficiency 
costs of departing from normative capitalizationP8 
E. Repairs 
Current law allows the cost of repairs to be expensed yet requires 
the cost of improvements and replacements (collectively, "improve-
ments") to be capitalized.179 This dichotomy between repairs and im-
provements grew out of the statutory antecedents to § 263, as well as 
regulations, and case law applying these authorities.18o Courts have 
crafted ephemeral distinctions to implement the dichotomy, like the 
one distinguishing between costs that "put" an asset into working con-
dition (capital) and those that "keep" it that way (deductible ).181 
Although neither Congress, the Service, nor the courts have offered 
anything but arguments based on precedent for allowing repairs to be 
deducted, some commentators have done SO.182 The argument is that 
expensing repair costs makes sense when, if capitalized, they would be 
subject to uneconomic depreciation that would result in greater in-
come measurement errors than would expensing.183 This is the same 
argument that I considered in Subsection III.A in the context of in-
tangibles costs. The argument is worth revisiting because it has two 
unique aspects as applied to repair costs that deserve separate analy-
sis: (1) Expensing the cost of long-lived repairs creates a bias in the 
used asset market, whereas expensing intangibles costs creates a bias 
across asset classes; and (2) where the cost of repairs are required to 
be capitalized and depreciated over a period longer than the useful 
life of the repair, the resulting increase in the effective tax rate for the 
asset being repaired actually may be neutrality enhancing in some 
cases. Consider the following example. 
A machine will last for exactly nine years if after every three years 
the machine is overhauled. If the overhaul merely keeps the machine 
in "ordinarily efficient operating condition" there is a good chance the 
cost of overhaul is deductible.184 Figure 4 depicts the value of the 
178 See, e.g., note 169 and accompanying text. 
179 Bittker & Lokken, note 94, 'lI 20.4.8. 
180 Id. (discussing cases). 
181 E.g., Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1926). 
182 E.g., Lee, note 1, at 351. 
183 Id. (arguing that where "[T]he recovery period for [a] capitalized [ repair] expendi-
ture was more than twice as long as the repair cycle . . . a current deduction ... would 
produce less distortion of income . . . than such ideal slow or no depreciation would 
cause.") (emphasis in original). 
184 E.g., Ingram Industries v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 532 (2000) (allowing tax-
payer to deduct the cost of overhauling tugboat engines where the overhaul would last 
three to four years). But see Vona1co v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 251 (1999), aff'd 
sub nom. Smith v. Commissioner, 300 F.3d 1023 (2002) (requiring periodic replacement of 
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machine over the course of its useful life assuming that (1) the ma-
chine depreciates in an even pattern, and (2) the periodic overhauls 
add value to the machine equal to their cost, which value dissipates in 
an even pattern until the next required overhaul. 
FIGURE 4 
VALUE OF MACHINE WITH NINE-YEAR LIFE THAT MUST BE 
OVERHAULED EVERY THREE YEARS 
Year 3 Year 6 Year 9 
Positing a market for used machines of this type highlights the prob-
lem caused by deducting the repair. The buyer of a machine immedi-
ately after repair must capitalize the entire purchase price, given that 
the machine is a distinct asset. I85 The buyer of a machine immediately 
before an overhaul, on the other hand, must capitalize the purchase 
price but may (by hypothesis) deduct the cost of the overhaul. Con-
sidering the tax benefit from deducting the overhaul, all else being 
equal, the sum of (1) the cost of the machine immediately before the 
overhaul plus (2) the cost of the overhaul will be less than the cost of a 
machine that was just overhauled. Allowing a deduction for the re-
pair thus introduces a bias into the used machine market in favor of 
machines in need of an overhaul. 
This bias may lead to perverse incentives. Consider the following 
example, based loosely on a case from the 1920's. 
parts of aluminum smelting pots to be capitalized where the parts that were replaced would 
last approximately three years); Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b) (requiring costs for maintenance that 
substantially prolongs the useful life of property to be capitalized). 
185 Bittker & Lokken, note 94, 'lI 20.4.1 ("The most definitive rule of law to emerge from 
Lincoln Savings and INDOPCO may be that expenditures resulting in the creation or en-
hancement of a separate and distinct asset must be capitalized."). 
Imaged with th  Permission ofN Y.U. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 57 Tax L. Rev. 601 2003-2004
2004] CAPITALIZATION EXCEPTIONS 
Suppose a taxpayer has a choice between buying a new tug-
boat for $100,000 or raising and restoring a sunken tugboat 
for $110,000. Assume that the subsequent life and utility of 
the old and new boats would be the same. In the absence of 
tax, the taxpayer should purchase the new boat. But if the 
taxpayer can expense the cost of raising and restoring the 
sunken boat, as opposed to capitalizing the cost of purchas-
ing the new boat, then the taxpayer has a tax incentive to 
make the inferior investment in the old tug.186 
601 
Requiring taxpayers to capitalize the cost of repairs lasting beyond 
one year eliminates this aftermarket disparity between machines in 
need of repair and those that have just been repaired. A new problem 
develops, however. 
A capital asset usually will have a useful life longer than a repair to 
that asset (otherwise no more than one repair would be required). In 
the above example, for instance, new machines last for nine years but 
overhauls last for only three years. Recovery of the cost of the repair 
over three years is appropriate, but the law forbids this practice, 
known as "component depreciation."187 Instead, the law requires cap-
ital improvements to machines and buildings to be recovered over the 
life of the asset as a whole.188 Forbidding component depreciation has 
been justified on administrative grounds-it would be too difficult to 
administer component depreciation because of the difficulty ascertain-
ing how many components comprise a given asset189 and the useful 
life of each component.190 In a system where tax depreciation sched-
ules are economic, no solution other than component depreciation si-
multaneously can (1) tax new and used machines neutrally and (2) not 
overtax owners of machines by unduly delaying the recovery of repair 
costs. 
186 Johnson, note 149, at 1088 (citing Zimmern v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 
1928)). 
187 IRC § 168(i)(6); Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 107th Cong., Technical Explanation 
of the "Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002," at 25 & nn.38-39 (Comm. Print 
2002). 
188 See IRC § 168(i)(6). 
189 For example, is a tug boat just a hull and an engine, or is each part in the engine a 
separate component? 
190 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 95th Cong., Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Real Es-
tate Depreciation 19 (Comm. Print 1978) (eliminating component depreciation would 
"contribute toward tax simplification by eliminating a source of controversy concerning the 
amounts allocable to various components, and the useful lives of the components"); cf. 
Metro National Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1440 (1987) (grappling with the 
question whether partitions, false ceilings, and sprinkler systems constituted "structural 
components" of a building for purposes of the investment tax credit). 
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The constraint that component depreciation is too administratively 
burdensome to be worthwhile precludes the first-best solution where 
tax depreciation is economic. The appeal of the two alternatives-
capitalizing the costs of repairs and recovering them over the useful 
live of the repaired asset or expensing repairs-depends on the impact 
on the effective tax rate. Where depreciation is economic, the closer 
the useful life of the repair is to the useful life of the asset as a whole, 
the more likely that capitalization is a second-best optimum; con-
versely, the greater the disparity between the useful life of the repair 
and the useful life of the asset as a whole, the more likely expensing is 
a second-best optimum. 
The conclusion that expensing the costs of relatively short-lived re-
pairs of long-lived assets is a second-best optimum given a world with 
economic depreciation does not necessarily hold if one substitutes cur-
rent law's depreciation schedules for economic depreciation. Treasury 
has estimated the effective tax rate for equipment at 30.9%; compare 
this with the much higher effective tax rates for inventories and land 
(both 37.5 % ).191 Requiring taxpayers to capitalize equipment repair 
costs would increase the effective tax rate on equipment and may 
bring it more closely in line with inventories and land. Consequently, 
eliminating the dichotomy between repairs and improvements for un-
dertaxed assets like equipment in fact may promote neutrality.192 
Summary-Arguments that repair costs should be expensed depend 
on the claim that uneconomic depreciation of repair costs renders cap-
italization of such costs inferior to expensing. This argument might be 
convincing if tax depreciation of the repaired asset were economic, at 
least in cases where the disparity between the useful life of the re-
paired asset and the useful life of the repair was significant enough so 
that the non-neutrality from depreciating the repair cost over the use-
fullife of the asset was greater than the non-neutrality from expensing 
the repair.193 Under current law, however, where tax depreciation of 
equipment (for example) is faster than economic depreciation, result-
ing in an effective tax rate lower than that for competing investments, 
capitalizing repair costs and depreciating them over an uneconomi-
cally long period might be neutrality enhancing. 
191 See text following note 66. 
192 Requiring capitalization of all equipment repairs that provide a benefit in the next 
taxable period would impose a tremendous administrative burden, suggesting the need for 
a de minimis exception. 
193 See Subsection lILA. 
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F. Indirect Costs 
The argument for expensing indirect costs is simple: It is too admin-
istratively burdensome to identify them.194 By indirect costs I mean 
costs incurred in the process of procuring a capital asset that are not 
transmitted directly to the seller of the asset, or for assets that are not 
purchased but are instead self-constructed, costs for things other than 
the raw materials incorporated into the asset itself. The price paid to 
the seller for a building is a direct cost but the fee paid to the broker is 
an indirect cost. If instead the taxpayer self-constructs, the cost of 
materials is a direct cost, but the time-value of the taxpayer's labor is 
an indirect cost. 
The claim that the administrative burden of identifying indirect 
costs is too great cannot be evaluated in isolation. Instead, this ad-
ministrative burden must be weighed against the cost of the inefficien-
cies that result from failing to identify and properly treat indirect 
costS.195 As discussed in the context of the other arguments, this pro-
cess of weighing the administrative costs and the costs of non-neutrali-
ties resulting from flawed capitalization rules is dependent on 
unavailable empirical data. The policymaker therefore is left to intuit 
her way to a policy determination that may be relatively easy in lim-
ited instances but, for the most part, will leave her to base policy deci-
sions on assumptions and hunches about the unobservable balance 
between administrative costs and the cost of allowing indirect costs of 
procuring capital assets to be expensed. 
Some identifiable features of the factual scenarios that raise indirect 
costs problems will make the policymaker's job easier or more diffi-
cult in certain cases. Where the indirect cost in question does not in-
volve an arm's length transaction, or where the good or service 
procured by the cost is part of a package of goods or services, con-
founding valuation and allocation problems arise that are likely to 
raise the administrative burdens of requiring indirect costs to be 
capitalized. 
For example, if the indirect cost in question is a brokerage commis-
sion that the buyer of a capital asset must pay, the commission alter-
natively might be paid (1) to an independent broker charging a one-
time fee linked to the particular transaction in question, (2) to an in-
dependent broker as a retainer for handling any and all transactions 
194 E.g., Guidance Regarding Deducting and Capitalizing Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 
77,701 (Dec. 19, 2002) ("The IRS and Treasury Department have concluded that the 
clearer reflection of income that might be gained by requiring capitalization of employee 
compensation and overhead does not offset the administrative and record keeping burdens 
imposed by a capitalization requirement.") 
195 Id. (In formulating the INDOPCO regulations, Treasury claims to have performed 
the appropriate balancing of benefits and burdens.) 
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that occur in a given time interval, or (3) to an employee who is 
trained as a broker and who spends part of her time brokering acquisi-
tions of capital assets and part of her time doing unrelated tasks. The 
first situation is clearly the easiest from the standpoint of tax adminis-
tration. There is no difficulty either establishing the quantum of the 
indirect cost or allocating it to a particular asset, since the cost is the 
amount paid and the allocation is unambiguous. 
The second situation presents more difficulties. If the taxpayer 
purchases more than one asset, how is the retainer fee paid to the 
broker to be divided among the assets purchased? According to time 
spent on each transaction? According to the relative values of the 
assets? If the broker worked on some potential acquisitions that did 
not come to pass, should part of the fee be deducted as a loss attribu-
table to an abandoned project? There is, even in this second case, no 
difficulty determining the quantum of the fee, since it is set by the 
parties' agreement; all of the problems relate to allocation of the fee 
among projects. 
In the third situation, administrative problems will be most severe 
since all of the allocation problems present in the second situation also 
are present and the quantum of the cost is not obvious. Some alloca-
tion of the costs of employing the broker (including both salary and 
overhead) must be made between the broke ring and nonbrokering 
services she performs as an employee. It is not apparent whether time 
should be the only factor in the allocation or whether other factors 
(such as the relative market value of the brokerage and nonbrokerage 
services performed) should influence the allocation. In this situation, 
administrative costs are likely to be very substantial. Difficult alloca-
tion and valuation problems requiring collection of large amounts of 
data that otherwise would not have to be collected would be typical of 
these cases. 
As in the case of repairs,196 allowing indirect costs to be expensed 
(or requiring them to be capitalized) may induce taxpayers to change 
their behavior. Certain costs of procuring capital assets can be either 
direct or indirect costs, depending on how the taxpayer structures her 
affairs. Recall that if she constructs a building herself, the time-value 
of her labor is an indirect cost, whereas if she purchases a building 
constructed by another, the price of the building (a direct cost) will 
include the time-value of the builder's labor. If the time-value of the 
labor of whoever builds the building is treated the same-required to 
be capitalized in both cases or allowed to be expensed in both cases-
no tax-induced behavior change will result. If, on the other hand, the 
time-value of labor is treated differently depending on whether the 
196 See Subsection III.E. 
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cost is direct or indirect, then we would expect taxpayer to shift to-
wards the tax-favored alternative. 
Taxpayers are not, however, completely responsive to tax prefer-
ences. There are frictions in the marketplace that impede taxpayers 
from always planning their affairs to minimize taxes.197 For example I 
might be worse at constructing buildings than the contractor I would 
hire in a world without taxes. If I may deduct the time-value of my 
labor but must capitalize the time-value of the contractor's labor, the 
tax-favored alternative is clearly to build the building myself. If, how-
ever, the tax advantage of the deduction is of less benefit to me than 
the cost of ending up with a less-well-constructed building due to my 
inferior skills as a builder, no tax-induced change in behavior will 
occur. 
To the extent frictions are likely to prevent tax-induced behavior 
changes, the policymaker should be less concerned about creating or 
perpetuating rules that treat direct and indirect costs differently. The 
reason is that the tax-induced behavior change that takes place in the 
absence of nontax frictions is a source of social waste.198 Suppose that 
a rule allows me to expense the cost of my time. If I do not change my 
behavior (as in the example above because I am such a poor builder 
that the tax preference cannot overcome my natural disinclination to 
build myself) then I will pay and the government will collect more tax 
than if I had changed behavior, but society will be no worse off. If, on 
the other hand, I do change my behavior, my tax costs and the govern-
ments receipts will be lower, but again they will net to zero. Impor-
tantly, however, society will be worse off because the competitive 
advantage of the builder will have been squandered and society will 
end up with a more poorly constructed building. 
Summary-There are clues available to assist the policymaker in 
weighing the administrative burden, on the one hand, and the costs to 
the tax system (for example, non-neutralities and resulting deadweight 
loss) of disparate rules for similar transactions, on the other hand. 
There will be cases where the burden obviously tips toward requiring 
indirect costs to be capitalized or allowing them to be expensed. Inev-
itably, however, there will be many cases in the middle where the poli-
cymaker lacks empirical data (or even good clues on which to base a 
197 David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 
1312 (2001). 
198 Id. at 1315 ("[E]nd runs consume resources and warp transactions, yielding social 
waste."); Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules 
Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 1, 31 (1992) (taxing relatively inelastic 
events raises more revenue and creates less welfare loss than taxing elastic events); Weis-
bach, Line Drawing, note 6, at 1663 ("We should tax similar things similarly to reduce 
substitution costs."). 
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hunch) with respect to both administrative costs and the costs of non-
neutrality. In these cases, the choice between fidelity to normative 
capitalization and an exception is inescapably ambiguous. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The following cases justify exceptions to normative capitalization: 
(1) with respect to property for which neutrality- enhancing depre-
ciation schedules cannot be set, or where the administrative burden of 
complying with and enforcing such depreciation schedules outweighs 
the benefits of the resulting neutrality improvement; 
(2) with respect to investment in short-lived property that occurs in 
a steady-state pattern, where the non-neutrality introduced by expens-
ing is relatively low and does less harm to the tax system than the 
administrative burden of normative capitalization; and 
(3) with respect to indirect costs when the difficulty of quantifying 
and allocating such costs among capital assets imposes a burden on 
the tax system greater than the costs of the non-neutrality that will 
result if such costs are not allocated. 
All three cases require the policymaker to compare the costs of fail-
ing to hue to the normative ideal with the administrative costs of do-
ing so. It is possible in identifiable cases to predict that the non-
neutrality from relaxing normative capitalization will be modest, im-
plying a low cost in terms of inefficiency (and also inequity), but even 
in these instances the policymaker's job is a difficult one, since the 
administrative burden of normative capitalization is not quantifiable. 
Still, the policymaker will be better able to perform her job armed 
with an estimate of the likely neutrality implications of creating an 
exception to normative capitalization in different situations than if she 
is left to guess about all of the inputs into the analysis. 
Imaged with th Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
